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DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL: A DYING
POLICY ON THE PRECIPICE
ROBERT I. CORREALES*
"When I Was in the Military, They Gave Me a Medal for Killing
Two Men and a Discharge For Loving One. "'
Assistant Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of
Nevada, Las Vegas. I wish to thank professors Annette Appell and Joan Howarth for
their thoughtful comments, and my two wonderful research assistants Kareema
Turner, and Jessica Goodey for their untiring efforts and their sharp editing pens.
1. Epitaph on the tombstone of Sergeant Leonard Matlovitch, a highly
decorated sergeant in the United States Air Force, who spent nearly twelve years in
the service. MARY ANN HUMPHREY, MY COUNTRY, MY RIGHT TO SERVE xxvii
(1990). This article is dedicated to the fine men and women who comprise the
membership of the Alexander Hamilton Post 448 of the American Legion. Dr. Paul
D. Hardman founded Post 448 in 1984 to provide an avenue for public service,
military pride, and long-overdue recognition for the sacrifice and valor of the
thousands of gay and lesbian members and veterans of the United States military.
See Alexander Hamilton Post 448, Historical Highlights,
http://www.post448.org/historical.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2008). The
membership of Post 448 includes veterans and the families of veterans of every war
in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Id. At great personal sacrifice, the
members of Post 448 have been active advocates and representatives of the gay
military community throughout the United States. Id. In 1987, Post 448 became the
first openly gay Veterans organization to place a wreath in a ceremony of the Tomb
of the Unknowns in Arlington National Cemetery to honor gay and lesbian people in
uniform who have made the ultimate sacrifice in service of this country. Id. Post 448
is an inclusive organization, recognized nationally for its activism pertaining to the
welfare of all military veterans, and especially for its tireless efforts to end the
discrimination based on sexual orientation in the United States military represented
by "Don't Ask, Don't Tell." See id.
413
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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite causing heavy personnel loses and tactical damage during
crucial times, the forced separation of gay service members from the
U.S. military since the passage of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"2 has
consistently been upheld by federal appellate courts.3 Appellate courts
have routinely denied challenges based on equal protection,
substantive due process, and first amendment rights.4 In the vast
majority of those cases, despite much evidence to the contrary, courts
have simply deferred to military judgment that the presence of known
homosexuals is detrimental to the military's ability to provide for
national defense.5 Courts have agreed with military advocates that
statements about sexual orientation constitute powerful indicators of
intent or propensity to engage in sexual conduct with people of the
same gender, easily turning sexual orientation identification into
sexual conduct.6 Importantly, the military has abandoned arguments
based on threats to public health, psychological instability, or
vulnerability to blackmail.7
The most successful argument in favor of the policy continues to
be deference to the judgment of a shrinking number of military leaders
regarding the protection of the sensibilities of a small group of
heterosexuals who would feel threatened by the presence of known
gays and lesbians. 8 That argument was also central to cases under the
former ban, confirming that, despite its apparent openness to gays and
lesbians, "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is no more than a defacto ban.9
2. "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" can be found at 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006). Some of
the implementing regulations can be found at DEP'T OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE 1332.14
(1993) [hereinafter DIRECTIVE 1332.14] and DEP'T OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE 1332.30
(1997) [hereinafter DIRECTIVE 1332.30]. In addition, each military branch maintains
separate administrative discharge procedures.
3. See, e.g., Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 919 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that
10 U.S.C. § 654 is constitutional).
4. See, e.g., id.
5. See, e.g., id.
6. See, e.g., id.
7. See Able v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 969, 973-74 (E.D.N.Y. 1995),
vacated, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998).
8. See id. at 976-77.
9. See generally MELISSA WELLS-PETRY, EXCLUSION: HOMOSEXUALS AND THE
RIGHT TO SERVE 7-10 (1993) (discussing the litigation that took place under the
[Vol. 44
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"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" essentially reduces gay military service
members to their sexual identity. It then creates a fiction whereby their
sexual identity can be sequestered and confined in a box every minute
of every hour of every day for the entire duration of their military
service. If any hint of their sexual orientation manages to escape, even
as they confide with counselors, clergymen or medical professionals,
gay service members may be targeted for expulsion and even
criminally prosecuted. For many gay service members, the price of
serving in the military imposed by the policy is a life of deception,
where the only way to survive is by passing as heterosexual twenty-
four hours a day, seven days a week, whether on or off military
bases) 0° Individuals and smaller groups, however, have found ways to
co-exist with their heterosexual comrades under the protection of
understanding superiors, or by developing informal support systems.II
This article examines the labyrinth of statutes, regulations and
directives that compose "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," a policy which those
suspected of being gay or lesbian find difficult, if not impossible, to
escape. It also analyzes the real-world and military consequences of
the de facto ban and the effects of the moral condemnation of gays
and lesbians by the U.S. Supreme Court upon deliberations of the
policy in Congress and upon lower courts that have presided over
challenges to the policy. Relying heavily on the legislative history of
former ban during 1971-1991).
10. See C. Dixon Osburn, A Policy' in Desperate Search of a Rationale. The
Military's Policy on Lesbians, Gays and Bisexuals, 64 UMKC L. REV. 199, 229-34
(1995) (documenting aggressive "witch hunts" of gays, lesbians and bisexuals by
commanding officers even after the passage of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell").
11. See Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 952 (4th Cir. 1996) where dissenting
Circuit Judge Hall discusses the experience of people under the command of Lt.
Paul Thomasson. Lt. Thomasson served for more than fifteen months after declaring
that he was gay. Though people in his unit disapproved of homosexuality, "[n]ot a
single sailor testified that he had suffered even mildly diminished morale." Id.
Yeoman Third Class John J. Broughton explained:
At first [after Thomasson's disclosure], I was shocked and did not know
whether or not to back out [of a volunteer assignment to work with
Thomasson] and work in my old office. I did not know whether I could
work with a homosexual. I decided to stick with the decision I made prior
to knowing of LT Thomasson's disclosure. I am glad I did . . . LT
Thomasson[,] in my opinion, is the best "LT" in the Navy.... His sexual
orientation had no adverse effect on myself or to the Navy.
Id. at 952 n.7.
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"Don't Ask, Don't Tell," and the social and political context under
which the policy was enacted, the article makes the case for a more
careful evaluation of the policy under a searching rational basis
analysis than has previously been attempted. The article argues that,
given all the evidence that has been ignored by Congress and the
courts since before the passage of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," the true
last-remaining reason for the policy is a level of legislative and
administrative animus toward homosexuals as a group, which most
other groups in the history of this country have rarely experienced.
The article thus argues that "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" may be the
prototypical case of invidious discrimination against a politically
unpopular group. Recognizing the reality that courts are likely to
continue ignoring a mountain of evidence and legal doctrine in favor
of overturning the law, nevertheless, the article concludes that
Congress should reconsider its earlier stance and, this time, get it right
by dismantling "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" in favor of a policy of non-
discrimination, as has been done in the majority of the civilized
world. 12
II. ADOPTION OF THE POLICY
The "Don't Ask, Don't Tell, Don't Pursue, Don't Harass" ("Don't
Ask, Don't Tell") policy replaced an outright ban on service by
homosexuals in the United States military. 13 Motivated partially by the
12. Representative Martin T. Meehan introduced the Military Readiness
Enhancement Act of 2007, a bill designed to overturn "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," to
the House of Representatives on February 28, 2007. Military Readiness
Enhancement Act of 2007, H.R. 1246, 110th Cong. (2007).
13. DEP'T OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE 1332.14 (1982), available at
http://dont.stanford.edu/regulations/regulation41 .pdf ("Homosexuality is
incompatible with military service. The presence in the military environment of
persons who engage in homosexual conduct or who, by their statements,
demonstrate a propensity to engage in homosexual conduct, seriously impairs the
accomplishment of the military mission. The presence of such members adversely
affects the ability of the Military Services to maintain discipline, good order, and
morale; to foster mutual trust and confidence among servicemembers, to ensure the
integrity of the system of rank and command; to facilitate assignment and worldwide
deployment of servicemembers who frequently must live and work under close
conditions affording minimal privacy; to recruit and retain members of the Military
Services; to maintain public acceptability of military service; and to prevent
breaches of security.").
416 [Vol. 44
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death of Alan Shindler, a U.S. Navy sailor who was brutally murdered
because of his sexual orientation, then presidential candidate Bill
Clinton promised to eliminate discrimination based on sexual
orientation in the military. President Clinton's proposal to eliminate
the ban was vigorously opposed. 14 The opposition galvanized around
the idea that a person who had never served in the military (Clinton)
should not dictate to military leaders how to manage personnel
matters. It managed to pit a so-called "draft dodger," against
honorable military veterans whose first-hand experience carried much
more weight. In 1993, after much acrimonious testimony from
representatives of every branch of the military and a large number of
members of Congress who supported the existing ban, and testimony
from a smaller number who opposed the ban, Congress passed "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell," changing essentially nothing.
The President hailed the 1993 law as a reasonable compromise
between full integration and complete exclusion. Significantly, many
military and congressional supporters of the exclusionary policy
finally admitted that gay men and women have performed honorably
and courageously in service of the United States of America for
generations.15 Indeed, despite the large numbers of forced separations
14. See BILL CLINTON, MY LIFE: THE PRESIDENTIAL YEARS 20-24 (2004)
(explaining that overwhelming opposition from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a veto-
proof resolution in the House opposing the lifting of the ban, and similar opposition
in the Senate, forced him to fall well short of the plan to eliminate the ban). Among
the most vocal opponents of changing the former policy were Generals Norman
Schwarzkopf and Colin Powell. Stressing the importance of an amorphous sense of
"morale," ".esprit de corps," "cohesiveness," and "discipline," members of Congress
repeatedly cited the two generals' views that changes in the former policy would not
only undermine good order or discipline but also that they would indeed "destroy
the military." 139 CONG. REC. S1262-02 (statement of Sen. Coats). Members of
Congress also took advantage of Clinton's lack of a military resume to undermine
the president's standing to bring about the change. Id. (statement of Sen. Smith) ("I
find it extremely troubling that someone with no military experience and a
controversial record of opposition to past military campaigns can so casually dismiss
the input of our Nation's most trusted and experienced military commanders.").
15. Unfortunately, even those statements managed to deny gays and lesbians
full recognition for their military sacrifices. To military leaders, gays had managed
to contribute only while being silent about their sexual orientation. See Policy
Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed Forces: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on
Armed Services, 103rd Cong. (1993) (statement of General McPeak)
("[H]omosexuals have served in the past .... Those who had successful tours, even
5
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before and after "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," the evidence indicates that
gay men and women have served, and continue to serve with
distinction in the U.S. military.' 6 Thousands have been wounded or
died in the service of this Country, earning, but never completely
enjoying, the respect and adulation they deserve for their sacrifices.
In a study of data from the 2000 Census, the Urban Institute found
that 36,000 gay men and women currently serve in the U.S. military. 7
That figure increases dramatically when the estimates of gay men and
women trained for guard or reserve duty are added.' 8 According to
conservative estimates, there are over 65,000 gay and lesbian military
personnel currently-including active duty, guard, and reservists.' 9
Those numbers pale in comparison to the numbers of living gay and
lesbian veterans, whose total is estimated to be nearly one million.20
Importantly, though most of these service members are currently
serving, or have served, in silence,2' many have managed to serve
openly without consequence.22
full careers, kept their homosexuality a secret."), see generallv ALLAN BERUBE,
COMING OUT UNDER FIRE: THE HISTORY OF MEN AND WOMEN IN WORLD WAR
Two (1990); RANDY SHILTS, CONDUCT UNBECOMING: LESBIANS AND GAYS IN THE
U.S. MILITARY (1993).
16. Staff Sergeant Eric Alva, the first American Marine wounded in Iraq, was
gay. Larry Shaughnessy, Gay Veteran Calls for End of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell, "
CNN, Mar. 1, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/02/28/gays.military/
index.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2008). Mr. Alva's heroism was recognized in a
meeting with President Bush. Id. In a speech on Capitol Hill to announce he was
leaving the military rather than continue a life of silence, Mr. Alva stated, "I'm an
American who fought for his country and for the protection and the rights and
freedoms of all American citizens-not just some of them, but all of them." Id.; see
generally Kurt D. Hermansen, Comment, Analyzing the Military 's Justifications for
Its Exclusionary Policy: Fifty Years Without a Rational Basis, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REV.
151 (1992) (chronicling the stories of several outstanding gay military members who
were discharged prior to "Don't Ask, Don't Tell").
17. GARY J. GATES, THE URBAN INST., GAY MEN AND LESBIANS IN THE U.S.
MILITARY: ESTIMATES FROM CENSUS 2000, at 1, 4 (2000), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411069_GayLesbianMilitary.pdf.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 7.
21. See generally MARGARETHE CAMMERMEYER WITH CHRIS FISHER, SERVING
IN SILENCE (1994). Cammermeyer admitted to being a lesbian and was then
dishonorably discharged. The Living Room, Biographies: Margarethe (Greta)
418 [Vol. 44
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A. What "Compromise"?
In passing "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," Congress declared that sexual
orientation would no longer be a basis for exclusion from military
service. However, the new statute and the implementing regulations
did little to change the status quo.23 And, in fact, may have made
matters worse. While purporting to open the door to military service
for gay men and women, Congress nonetheless declared that
"[m]ilitary life is fundamentally different from civilian life, 24 and that
"[t]he prohibition against homosexual conduct is a longstanding
element of military law that continues to be necessary in the unique
circumstances of military service." 25 In finding that "[s]uccess in
Cammermeyer, http://andrejkoymasky.com/liv/fam/biocl/camml.html (last visited
Mar. 30, 2008). After winning her civil suit against the military, she was rehired and
served openly for three more years. Id.
22. It is not uncommon for gay service members to serve openly in the
military. Navy Lieutenant Jenny Kopfstein's case is typical of cases where the
military has chosen to retain gay men or women who were filling critical needs at
the time of their outing. Kopfstein served openly for two years before her discharge.
Gay Veterans of War on Terror Sue Pentagon for Re-Instatement, SLDN, Dec. 6,
2004, http://www.sldn.org/templates/press/record.html?record= 1718. Colonel
Margarethe Cammermeyer served openly for three years. The Living Room, supra
note 21. Captain Rich Richenberg also served openly. Eric Schmitt, The New Rules
on Gay Soldiers: A Year Later, No Clear Results, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1995, at 1.
See generally Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1069 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(stating the Navy conceded that despite its policy to remove gays and lesbians,
which provided for no exceptions, "the Navy did retain some officers with
'homosexual tendencies"'); HUMPHREY, supra note 1 (chronicling the stories of
dozens of gay men and women who served openly in the military).
23. Although Congressman Studds voted for the policy, he showed his
frustration with "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" when he stated:
Whatever action we take on the bill before us, the ban on lesbians and gay
men in the military will remain. The DOD Directive issued in July at the
President's behest was far from the result for which I had hoped and
worked for so many years. Under the directive, lesbians and gay men will
continue to be subject to investigation and separation from the military
merely for speaking privately about their sexual orientation or engaging in
private consensual relationships. This perpetuates a situation in which gay
men and lesbians are denied the security, dignity, and openness in their
private lives which their comrades in arms take for granted.
139 CONG. REC. H7065-03 (1993) (statement of Rep. Studds).
24. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (a)(8) (1993).
25. Id. § 654(a)(13).
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combat requires military units that are characterized by high morale,
good order and discipline, and unit cohesion,, 26 Congress essentially
deferred to military leaders' judgment that homosexual conduct,
broadly defined to include declarations of homosexual identity,
constitutes a hindrance to military preparedness and morale, 27 while
ignoring comprehensive studies that had found the opposite to be true.
Congress' deference, combined with a continued willingness by courts
to infer conduct from status, would later serve to defeat challenges to
the policy when other justifications fell apart under judicial scrutiny,
or were simply ignored or abandoned by military advocates. 28
Despite the existence of comprehensive studies by the RAND
Corporation and by the Government Accounting Office (GAO), 29 all
of which had found that openly gay men and women could serve
without much of an effect on military preparedness or morale,
Congress relied heavily on the work of a Military Working Group
(MWG) convened by the Department of Defense (DOD) for the
purpose of analyzing the proposed changes. 30 General John Otjen, a
26. Id. § 654(a)(6).
27. See id § 654(a)(15). I use the term "defer" because military leaders did not
present data to support their assertions. See HUMPHREY, supra note 1, at viii. Rather,
they presented anecdotal accounts of the effect of a known homosexual on the
morale of their charges. See id. at viii-ix, where Congressman Gerry E. Studds (D-
Mass), the first openly gay member of Congress, discusses the existence of a study
done by the Pentagon that concluded that gays and lesbians could serve openly in
the military without negative consequences. See also NAT'L DEF. RESEARCH INST.,
SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL POLICY: OPTIONS AND
ASSESSMENT (1993) [hereinafter RAND STUDY].
28. See Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp 850, 854 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), rev'd,
155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998) (detailing the systematic abandonment of those
justifications to support a ban on gay military service). President Clinton's executive
order ended discrimination based on sexual orientation in the issuance of security
clearances, thereby ending concerns that people holding security clearance could use
sexual orientation for blackmail. Exec. Order No. 12,698, 60 Fed. Reg. 40,245 (Aug.
2, 1995). Clinton's Executive Order applies to civilian workers in the Federal
Government and to people in uniform. Id.
29. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEFENSE FORCE MANAGEMENT: DOD's
POLICY ON HOMOSEXUALITY (1992).
30. OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF DEF., DOD, SUMMARY REPORT OF THE MILITARY
WORKING GROUP 1 (1993), available at http://dont.stanford.edulregulations/
milworkgroup.pdf [hereinafter MWG].
420 [Vol. 44
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strong supporter of the former ban, chaired the MWG.3 The MWG
was unified in its advocacy for an absolute ban, and aggressively
opposed change. In its report on the status of gays in the military, the
MWG insisted that: "All homosexuality"-"known" and "unknown,"
belonging to "practicing" and "non-practicing homosexuals"-'"is
incompatible with military service." Citing a study of military
discharges covering fiscal years 1989-1992, the MWG asserted that
"[o]f all discharges for homosexuality, at least 79 percent clearly
involved homosexual conduct. 32
The MWG's "study" of military discharges under the gay ban
stands in stark contrast to a similar study done recently by the GAO.
Contrary to the findings of the MWG, the GAO found that most
discharges under "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" are the result of statements
about the person's sexual orientation, not as a result of prohibited
sexual conduct.33 At first glance, the difference between the two
studies is puzzling. Closer inspection reveals that the drastically
different conclusions between the two studies are explained by
variations in the criteria utilized to define conduct, and likely by the
goals that were being pursued by the two different groups. In contrast
to the GAO's mandate, which is simply to study a problem and report
its analysis, the MWG advocated aggressively for the continuation of
the gay ban, despite its charge to analyze and evaluate the issue. Its
conclusion that most discharges prior to the policy were the result of
homosexual sexual conduct, is consistent with a broad definition of
"homosexual conduct" to include statements demonstrating a
31. Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 951 (4th Cir. 1996) (Hall, J., dissenting).
General Otjen stated, "'there's is a collective sense in the military . . . that
homosexuality is wrong."' Id. He "believed that all the members of the Military
Working Group shared this 'collective sense."' Id. However, "he conceded that, but
for fear and prejudice against homosexuals, the policy would be unnecessary." Id.
32. MWG, supra note 30, at 11.
33. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MILITARY PERSONNEL: FINANCIAL
COST AND Loss OF CRITICAL SKILLS DUE TO DOD's HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT
POLICY CANNOT BE COMPLETELY ESTIMATED 11 (2005) [hereinafter GAO:
MILITARY PERSONNEL]. Numerous commentators have deconstructed the military's
reliance on statements as indicators of conduct. In her analysis of "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell," Judith Butler concluded that a sort of fear of contagion permeates the
military's attitudes toward gays and lesbians, as if an "infection through the ear"
were possible through statements such as "I am a homosexual." See JUDITH BUTLER,
EXCITABLE SPEECH: A POLITICS OF THE PERFORMATIVE 116 (1997).
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"propensity" to engage in such conduct, and is consistent with its
position that all manifestations of homosexuality are incompatible
with military service.
Not surprisingly, the MWG's conclusions were also consistent
with the moral condemnation of gays by many military and political
leaders during Congressional debates over the passage of "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell." Ignoring the comprehensive study by the RAND
Corporation, which had been commissioned by the Pentagon, and
relying instead on anecdotal stories, personal opinions of military
leaders, the MWG's "findings"-which were little more than personal
opinions,34-and the powerful legacy of Bowers v. Hardwick, political
and military leaders framed President Clinton's initiative as an attack
on national security. They also reduced gays in the military to the role
of aggressive criminal sexual predators, while portraying
heterosexuals as inexperienced and vulnerable young people, whose
parents relied on the military to protect them from what the Supreme
Court had deemed to be criminal conduct of the worst kind.35
Callously, they even invoked the image of unfortunate disabled
military veterans who would have to compete with carriers of AIDS
for scant medical resources after their service commitment had
ended.36
The threat posed by openly gay service members was so great that
even those who held the slightest hint of same sex attraction or
affection toward their fellow service members could undermine the
military's ability to promote unit cohesion and morale. According to
military leaders, the mere presence of a known homosexual could
cause entire units to abandon their responsibilities to defend the
country.37 Therefore, as a "compromise," Congress purported to
eliminate sexual orientation as a bar to service while continuing to
34. See MWG, supra note 30, at 5-11.
35. In the debate about "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" Senator Mosley-Braun quoted
the Commandant of the Marine Corps: "'[h]ow would you react if your son called
and informed you that his roommates for the next 2 years were two homosexuals."'
139 CONG. REc. S1262-02 (1993) (statement of Sen. Mosley-Braun).
36. See id. (statement of Sen. Murkowski) ("A decision to admit gays to the
military will not be a free one. That decision will be paid for in increased funding
for VA, or by the veterans VA must turn away in order to care for the new AIDS
cases the decision will bring.").
37. See generally id.
422 [Vol. 44
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prohibit broadly-defined sexual conduct between people of the same
gender.3
8
Not surprisingly, the promise of that "compromise" has been
illusory.39 Though the DOD directive implementing the new law
appears to focus on conduct and not identity, 40 gay service members
have been separated from the military based on their sexual
orientation in even greater numbers since the passage of the policy,
41
unless, of course, they are needed, pursuant to what has become a
policy of convenience. 42 To that end, the military has maintained a
system of flexible regulations designed to respond to staffing needs
during times of crisis. For example, during the Vietnam War the
military suspended many removal proceedings of gay service
members when it could not be sure that it would have enough people
in uniform to carry out the war.4 3 The same occurred during the
38. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (2006).
39. See, e.g., Aaron A. Seamon, Comment, The Failed Compromise of 10
U.S.C. § 654: An Assessment of the Military's "Don'tAsk, Don't Tell" Policy, 24 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 319 (1999).
40. DIRECTIVE 1332.14, supra note 2.
41. MICHELLE BENECKE & DIXON OSBURN, SERVICEMEMBERS LEGAL DEF.
NETWORK, CONDUCT UNBECOMING: THE 3RD ANNUAL REPORT ON "DON'T ASK,
DON'T TELL, DON'T PURSUE" 2 (1996-1997), available at http://
www.sldn.org/binary-data/SLDNARTICLES/pdf file/166.pdf. Janet Halley has
argued persuasively that "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is far worse that its predecessor.
JANET E. HALLEY, DON'T: A READER'S GUIDE TO THE MILITARY'S ANTI-GAY
POLICY 1-2 (1999). Halley points out that while the outright ban was as bad as it
looked, the new policy, in contrast, is "designed to look like conduct regulation in
order to hide the fact that it turns decisively on status. Id. at 2.
42. Wisconsin Rep. Scott Gunderson explained in the debates over "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" that "when in need of manpower during the Vietnam war, the military
consistently accepted recruits and draftees despite their acknowledgment during
questioning of their homosexuality." 139 CONG. REC. H7065-03 (1993) (statement
of Rep. Gunderson).
43. Randy Shilts documented the reduction of discharges based on sexual
orientation during the Vietnam War by reviewing the military's own statistics.
SHILTS, supra note 15, at 70. "Between 1963 and 1966, for example, the Navy
discharged between 1,600 and 1,700 enlisted members a year for homosexuality."
Id. However, from 1966 to 1967, the number of gays discharged fell to 1094. Id. The
trend continued downward in 1968 when the Navy ejected 798 enlisted men for
homosexuality, and remained steadily downward as the Navy discharges based on
homosexuality dropped to 643 at the height of the war in 1969 and 461 the
following year. Id.
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Persian Gulf War under President George H. Bush,4 and again during
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan under President George W. Bush.45
The retention of gay personnel during crucial times undermines
the most common argument against their presence in the military-
that their service undermines unit discipline and cohesion in wartime.
It also reveals a side of military life that has been hidden from view by
opponents of gays in uniform. 46 The stories are too numerous to count
of openly gay military personnel co-existing with heterosexuals in the
day-to-day life of the military.47 Indeed, openly gay individuals have
44. Wade Lambert & Stephanie Simon, U.S. Military Moves to Discharge
Some Gay Veterans of Gulf War, WALL ST. J., July 30, 1991, at B6 (detailing how
the Army put ongoing personnel discharge actions "on hold" while gay soldiers
were sent to the Gulf War, only to discharge them upon their return). Similarly
concerned about military staffing during the Gulf War, President George H. Bush
issued Executive Order 12728 on August 22, 1990, invoking the "stop loss" order
under 10 U.S.C. 673 (c). Exec. Order No. 12,728, 55 Fed. Reg. 35,029 (1990). The
stop-loss orders during wartime have not escaped the attention of Congress. During
the debates on "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," Senator Mosley-Braun observed:
We would expect, then, that in wartime-when unit cohesion can literally
mean the difference between life and death-the military would be
especially vigilant in ferreting out and discharging gay soldiers. But in
fact, Mr. President, the record clearly demonstrates that precisely the
opposite is true. From World War II through Operation Desert Storm,
whenever American Forces have gone into battle the Pentagon has always
found a way to keep suspected or acknowledged homosexuals in uniform.
139 CONG. REc. S1262-02 (1993) (statement of Sen. Mosley-Braun).
45. See SHARON E. DEBBAGE ALEXANDER ET AL., SERVICEMEMBERS LEGAL
DEF. NETWORK, CONDUCT UNBECOMING: THE TENTH ANNUAL REPORT ON "DON'T
ASK, DON'T TELL, DON'T PURSUE, DON'T HARASS" (2004), available at
http://www.sldn.org/binary-data/SLDNARTICLES/pdf file/141 l.pdf. SLDN has
noticed a reduction in the numbers of gay discharges from the military during the
Afghanistan and Iraqi Wars. Id. at 1. In fiscal year 2003 discharges of gays and
lesbians plummeted 17%. Id.
46. TASK FORCE ON MILITARY PERS., REPUBLICAN RESEARCH COMM.,
PROPOSAL TO END THE BAN ON GAYS IN THE MILITARY 14 (1993), available at
http://dont.stanford.edu/regulations/RRCTFOMP.pdf ("Those who have served
successfully in the military, and there have been large numbers of successful
homosexuals who have performed on tours of duty or even completed careers and
retired from the services, but they have either been celibate or they have been so
secretive that the homosexual practices were not identified, not called to the [sic]
attention, and their behavior did not have to be dealt with.").
47. See generally STEVEN ZEELAND, BARRACK BUDDIES AND SOLDIER
LOVERS: DIALOGUES WITH GAY YOUNG MEN IN THE U.S. MILITARY (1993); Press
12
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been able to co-exist with heterosexuals in uniform for a long time,
forming all of the complex relationships that exist in the rest of
American society,48 suggesting that even if the policy were to be
overturned, little would change in the military. The public debate as to
whether openly gay service members should be allowed to serve has
so far managed to ignore the existence of all of these complex social
relationships.
B. Don't Ask
The so-called "compromise" hardly opened the door for gays in
the military. President Clinton's claim that the "Don't Ask" portion of
the policy represented his most important success in this area rings
hollow when one considers the policy in operation. Although the new
federal statute prohibited recruiters and commanders from asking
direct questions about a person's sexual orientation, the implementing
rules do not prohibit indirect intrusive questions about a person's
sexual orientation, 49 nor do they prohibit reliance on information
about a person's sexuality gathered from fellow servicemembers. 50
Moreover, nowhere does the policy provide a remedy to service
members discharged in violation of the law;51 nor does the statute or
its implementing rules provide a sanction to the military for
noncompliance. 52 Further, in a savings provision to the statute,
Congress reserved for the Secretary of Defense the authority to
reinstate questioning of recruits if the Secretary determines that such
Release, Servicemembers Legal Def Network, Army Drops Discharge of Gay
Reservist (Jan. 16, 2001), available at www.sldn.org/templates/press/
record.html?section=2&record=220 (discussing the story of Lt. Steve May, a
Republican member of the Arizona House, who was allowed to serve out his term of
service after fighting the military's attempt to expel him for two years).
48. See, e.g., ZEELAND, supra note 47.
49. See HALLEY, supra note 41, at 49-50. Halley discusses the case of Sergeant
Steven Spencer, who was discharged under "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" from the Army
Reserve. Id. at 50-51. Though the Army never directly asked Spencer whether he
was gay, it did ask questions such as whether he ever stated he was a homosexual,
whether he ever stated he was bisexual, or intended to engage in future homosexual
acts. Id. at 51.
50. Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
51. See 10 U.S.C. § 654.
52. See id.
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questioning is necessary to effectuate the policy.53 The end result is a
scenario where lone military personnel are pitted against a military
free from civilian control, that has not only refused to support the
stated goals of the policy, but instead has resisted them at every turn.
The absence of remedies or sanctions for noncompliance renders this
section of the policy essentially meaningless.
C. Don't Tell
To eliminate the perceived threat of homosexual conduct, the law
provides that service members can be removed for: 1) engaging or
attempting to engage in homosexual acts,54 2) for marrying or
attempting to marry a person of the same sex,55 or 3) for stating that
he or she is a homosexual 56 in what has come to be known as the
"Don't Tell" principle. 57 Under that principle, the revelation of a
person's sexual orientation, either through the person's own words or
through the testimony of another person, raises a presumption that the
person is a homosexual.58 If not rebutted, the presumption leads to
discharge from the l...ita .. T ,ough, a small numbcr of pcopie have
successfully rebutted that presumption, the hurdle raised by the
presumption is virtually impossible to overcome. 60
The law's conflation of identity and conduct, and appellate courts'
deference to military judgment, have resulted in an amalgam of
confusing opinions, leaving unanswered the question of exactly how
gay men and women can serve in the military now that the prohibition
against their presence has been lifted. The statute's definition of the
term "homosexual" contributes much to this confusion. The statute
53. See id. § 654(e).
54. Id. § 654(b)(1).
55. Id. § 654(b)(3).
56. Id. § 654(b)(2).
57. Id.
58. Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 937 (4th Cir. 1996) (Luttig, J.,
concurring).
59. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b).
60. See Able v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 968, 976 (E.D.N.Y. 1995),
vacated, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting
that members in the process of discharge "[have] only at best a hypothetical chance
to escape separation.").
426 [Vol. 44
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defines "homosexual" as "a person, regardless of sex, who engages in,
has a propensity to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual
acts," 61 directly incorporating broadly-defined same gender sexual
conduct or propensity for such conduct into the identity of the
individual. Nowhere in the statute, regulations, or Directives does the
government provide a definition of a qualified gay service member.
In perhaps the most revealing statement about the hopeless
situation faced by gay men and women in the military who are
targeted for removal under the policy, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals declared that a service member shall be separated
if there is a finding "[t]hat the member has stated that he or she is a
homosexual or bisexual, or words to that effect, unless there is a
further finding.., that the member has demonstrated that he or she
is not a person who engages in, attempts to engage in, has a
propensity to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual
acts."
62
The court continued, "to avoid discharge, a service member who
has declared, 'I am a homosexual,' must prove that he or she is not a
homosexual as that term is defined in the statute."63 A close analysis
of the policy in operation, however, reveals that the court should have
emphasized the words: "to avoid discharge, a service member who
has declared, 'I am a homosexual' must prove that he or she is not a
homosexual," rather than the last clause of its statement. Indeed, to
overcome the presumption, the individual must essentially
demonstrate that he or she is a heterosexual who may have
accidentally and temporarily strayed from his or her true sexual
orientation.64
Noting that the statute defines a homosexual as "a person of either
gender 'who engages in, attempts to engage in, . . . or intends to
61. 10 U.S.C. § 654(f)(1).
62. See Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 259 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting 10
U.S.C. § 654(b)(2)).
63. Id.
64. See Able, 880 F. Supp. at 976 (observing that examples of successful
challenges by service members discharged for stating they were homosexual or
bisexual were "aberrations" limited to "atypical" cases in which "the member stated
at the discharge hearing that he or she was gay, but was apparently able to escape
discharge by stating that he or she did not intend to engage in 'homosexual acts"').
15
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engage in homosexual acts,' 65 the court mentioned the cases of seven
people who were able to overcome the presumption, to support its
assessment that "[t]he DOD Directive explicitly states that the military
will not exclude service members for their homosexual thoughts,
opinions, fantasies, or orientation." 66 Closer examination of the cases
cited reveals that service members who have been able to overcome
the presumption are limited to those whom identified themselves as
heterosexuals, or who had not yet fully identified themselves as gay
before they were threatened with discharge.
67
D. Don't Pursue
Despite the appearance of investigatory limitations, the threshold
to justify an investigation into a person's intent or propensity to
engage in homosexual conduct is very low. Thus, the military may
begin an investigation based on a joke about a service member's
sexual orientation, or even an obscure reference.68 Moreover,
"homosexual conduct" is construed broadly. Therefore, virtually any
touching of another person of the same gender, such as holding hands,
can provide grounds for investigation and eventual discharge.
65. Richenberg, 97 F.3d at 259 (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2)).
66. Id. at 261.
67. In a concurring opinion, Judge Luttig revealed that 10 U.S.C. § 654
provides that "a service member who states that he is homosexual (or otherwise
evidences his homosexuality) shall be separated from service unless he demonstrates
that he is not, as statutorily defined, a 'homosexual."' Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d
915, 937 (4th Cir. 1996). In support of this interpretation, Judge Luttig noted that
Secretary Aspin had also "affirmed that the policy disqualifies from service all
known homosexuals, agreeing in response to questions from Senator Gramm that,
under the policy, military personnel 'would at least be assured that no one would be
a self-professed homosexual and be allowed to continue to serve."' Id. at 938.
68. The case of Timothy R. McVeigh, an accomplished seventeen-year veteran
of the U.S. Navy, is an example of the military's pursuit of individuals despite the
directives not to pursue. Seamon, supra note 39, at 319. Senior Chief McVeigh was
"outed" to the military by a non-commissioned officer on board McVeigh's
submarine, who reported to the Navy that his spouse had learned of McVeigh's
sexual orientation when she came across his profile on America On-Line (AOL). Id.
at 319-21. Importantly, McVeigh's commander chose not to begin an investigation
when he learned that McVeigh might be gay. Id. at 321 n.9. However, the Navy
pursued the matter and arranged for AOL's assistance to identify McVeigh. Id. at
320-21.
428 [Vol. 44
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E. Don't Harass
The "Don't Harass" component of the policy is the result of
Directives passed by various military agencies in reaction to continued
harassment of gays and lesbians even after the lifting of the gay ban.69
As originally designed, "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" did not contain an
anti-harassment component. The military passed the rules governing
harassment on the basis of sexual orientation largely as a result of the
death of Army Private First Class Barry Winchell, who was beaten to
death by a fellow soldier because of his sexual orientation.7 °
Unfortunately, despite attempts by DOD and the military to curb
harassment against gays in uniform, harassment based on sexual
orientation has remained constant since the passage of "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell.'
In a comprehensive study of sexual harassment of homosexuals in
the military published March 16, 2000, the Inspector General's office
of the DOD found that 37% of all respondents had witnessed or
experienced harassment on the basis of perceived homosexuality.72
Those respondents who did report witnessing harassment were also
asked whether the harassment was witnessed by someone senior to
either the victim of the harassment or the perpetrator. 73 "Seventy-three
percent stated that the senior person did not do anything to
immediately stop the harassment. ' 74 Seventy-one percent of the
respondents attributed the harassment to enlisted service members.75
Of those who asserted that they would not feel free to report
harassment, approximately 71% feared retaliation towards themselves
and well over 70% feared retaliation to the person being harassed.7 6
69. See Department of Defense Issues Review of Efforts to Curb Anti-Gay
Harassment, SLDN, June 29, 2004, http://www.sldn.org/templates/press/
record.html?record= 1548 (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
70. Id.
71. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DOD, EVALUATION REPORT: MILITARY
ENVIRONMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT POLICY 8-13 (2000),
available at http://www.dodig.mil/Audit/reports/fy00/00-101 .pdf.
72. Id. at 8.
73. Id. at 11.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 12.
76. Id. at 16.
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Outside of potential discipline of the harasser, the Directives do
not provide a remedy to the victim. Not surprisingly, the military may
begin an investigation into the sexual orientation of victims of
harassment if it deems the information reliable, whatever its source.
This puts victims of harassment into a potential catch-22. Before
deciding whether to report the harassment, they must also consider the
possibility of an investigation and potential discharge. Therefore,
rather than protecting victims of harassment, the directives serve to
further disempower the most vulnerable class.
III. THE MORE THINGS CHANGE... THE WORSE THEY GET
In reality, little has changed since the passage of the policy.
Indeed, things may be even worse for gay people in uniform under the
new policy. 7 Despite the new openness to military service by gay
men and women expressed by some supporters of "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell," homosexual identity has continued to be used to instigate
military discharges. Several studies have revealed that the military's
aggressive enforcement of the defacto gay ban represented by "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell" resulted in a significant increase in discharges based
on sexual orientation in the first seven years under the policy, as
compared to the previous ten years under the complete ban.78
However, a study compiled by the Michael D. Palm Center shows
that, as has been the case with virtually every war, personnel shortages
during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have resulted in a sharp
reduction of gay discharges.7 9 Indeed, as a result of the severe
personnel shortages, many openly gay military members have been
allowed, or have even been required, to finish their terms,
undermining the military's most aggressive argument in opposition to
their service.80
77. See HALLEY, supra note 41, at 1-2.
78. See, e.g., GAO: MILITARY PERSONNEL, supra note 33, at 6.
79. See Press Release, Michael D. Palm Ctr., Researchers Locate Army
Document Ordering Commanders Not to Fire Gays (Sept. 13, 2005), available at
http://www.palmcenter.org/press/dadt/releases/researcherslocatearmydocument_
ordering commanders not tofire_gays.
80. See, e.g., Press Release, Servicemembers Legal Def. Network, supra note
430 [Vol. 44
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The forced separation of gay and lesbian service members from
the United States military since the passage of "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" has resulted in a tremendous loss of human potential. It has also
resulted in large financial losses in every branch. 8' In a 2005 study of
the financial costs and costs of critical skills of the policy, the GAO
found that although the total cannot be accurately estimated, the first
ten-year period of the policy was extremely costly to the DOD. 2
According to the GAO, the average annual cost from 1994-2003
to recruit military service members was $10,500 per person.83 During
that time, 9352 gay service members were discharged, resulting in an
estimated total cost of approximately $95 million to recruit
replacements. 84 The estimated cost to train replacements for the
service members separated under the policy totaled roughly $95
million.85 The Navy spent an estimated $48.8 million, the Air Force
spent an estimated $16.6 million, and the Army spent an estimated
$29.7 million.8 6 Those figures do not include the cost to train
replacements in the Marine Corps.87 Importantly, because of a lack of
data, the figures do not include the cost of investigation,
counseling/pastoral service for discharged members, separation
procedures, the cost of review board operations and the cost of
defending legal challenges to the policy. 88 A more comprehensive
study of the cost of the policy, conducted by a blue ribbon
commission organized by the University of California at Santa
Barbara, concluded that the actual cost of implementing the policy
was almost twice as much as the GAO estimated, or approximately
$363 million dollars.8 9
81. See GAO: MILITARY PERSONNEL, supra note 33, at 3-4.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 12.
84. Id. at 13.
85. Id. at 14.
86. Id. at 14-15.
87. Id. at 14.
88. Id. at 15-16. Similarly, the cost of the ban before "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
was a concern for members of Congress during the debates on "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell." Senator Boxer noted that the military spent $27 million per year under the old
ban to root out gays and lesbians, money that could be better spent elsewhere or
saved. 139 CONG. REC. S 1262-02 (1993) (statement of Sen. Boxer).
89. FRANK J. BARRETT ET AL., FINANCIAL ANALYSIS OF "DON'T ASK, DON'T
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The cost of forced separation to the military and service members
is much more than economic. It has also been strategically damaging
to the military, and personally and professionally devastating to many
of the discharged service members. Recent headlines have confirmed
that hundreds of separated service members were crucial to the
military's goals of successfully carrying out wars in distant lands that
have brought the U.S. military across unfamiliar languages and
cultures.90 Those service members, and many more like them, have
not only been denied the opportunity to serve during these crucial
times, but have also been forced to endure the emotional and
psychological trauma of an involuntary transition to civilian life in a
stigmatized status. 91
Besides the personal costs, the forced transition to civilian life is
sometimes accompanied by economic or professional hardship. To its
credit, for many generations the military has provided educational and
employment opportunities where none existed, by means of the
Montgomery G.I. Bill.92 However, although ostensibly allowed to
serve under the new policy, gay service members run a constant risk
of losing jobs and benefits. Gay service members with distinguished
military histories have been discharged just short of retirement, losing
valuable military pensions.93 Others have been forced to repay the cost
TELL": How MUCH DOES THE GAY BAN COST? 1 (2006), available at
http://www.palmcenter.org/files/active/O/2006-FebBlueRibbonFinalRpt.pdf.
90. See, e.g., Anne Hull, How 'Don't Tell' Translates, WASH. POST, June 18,
2004, at Al. Approximately 8% of service members discharged under "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" held critical occupations. BARRETT ET AL., supra note 89, at 16.
Approximately 3% of them had skills in important foreign languages, like Arabic
and Korean. Id. at 3-4.
91. For many gay people in uniform, forced separation from the military
amounts to a humiliating public disclosure of what should have been a very private
matter. Discharge documents for people expelled pursuant to "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" contain a narrative reason for the discharge, such as "homosexual conduct" or
"engaged in homosexual acts." ROBERTA ACHTENBERG & KAREN MOULDING,
SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW § 7.9 (2008). The discharge documents also
contain reenlistment codes showing that the member is barred from reenlistment. Id.
92. See generally DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, THE MONTGOMERY GI BILL-
ACTIVE DUTY 2 (2004), available at http://www.gibill.va.gov/pamphlets/CH30/
CH30_Pamphlet.pdf
93. For example, the Army discharged Lt. Col. Steve Loomis for being gay,
just eight days from his twenty-year retirement date, resulting in the forfeiture of his
retirement pension. Complaint at 1, Loomis v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 503 (2005)
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of their education though they were willing to fully complete their
military commitments.94 Though dishonorable discharges have been
utilized less often under the new policy than under the former ban, a
general discharge, unlike an honorable discharge, has many negative
consequences. For example, those who receive a general discharge
lose educational benefits under the Montgomery G.I. Bill. 95 Veterans
Affairs benefits, retirement benefits and federal loan benefits may also
be jeopardized with a less than honorable discharge. 96
Fatefully, wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and catastrophic disaster
at home, have drained the military's human resources. The drain in
human resources has been worsened by the military's lack of success
in recruiting and by the military's policies that govern the
mobilization of reserve military personnel. The wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and the Army's lack of success in recruiting, have
caused serious damage to the Army's ability to sustain the pace of
troop deployments long enough to counter insurgencies in those
countries. 97 To make up for the shortage of personnel, the military has
lowered its qualification standards. 98 However, it continues to defend
aggressively its virtual gay ban.
(No. 03-1653C).
94. See, e.g., Hensala v. Dept. of the Air Force, 343 F.3d 951, 953-55 (9th Cir.
2003) (detailing the case of John D. Hensala, a gay medical doctor who declared his
sexual orientation but nonetheless desired to remain in the military was discharged
under "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" and made to repay the cost of his medical
education-$71,429.53).
95. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 92, at 2.
96. To receive benefits under the Montgomery G.I. Bill, members of the
military must serve for two or three years and receive an Honorable discharge. Id at
2, 6. Service members who "come out" or who are "outed" may receive a less than
honorable discharge, putting their V.A. benefits at risk. 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(d)(5)
(1997).
97. See Julian E. Barnes, Marines Who Served Will Be Ordered Back, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 23, 2006 (reporting that the Marines Corps "would begin calling
Marines back to active-duty service on an involuntary basis to serve in Iraq and
Afghanistan" because of the shortage of personnel).
98. Press Release, Michael D. Palm Ctr., Military Enlistment of Felons Has
Doubled (Feb. 13, 2007) available at http://www.palmcenter.org/press/dadt/
releases/militaryenlistment of felons has doubled.
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IV. STATUS EQUALS CONDUCT
Much of the legal framework that collapsed homosexual status
into conduct in many areas of U.S. society, including the military, is
founded upon the Supreme Court's opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick.99
In Bowers, the Supreme Court considered an appeal by the state of
Georgia regarding a facial challenge to a state statute that criminalized
sodomy. 100 The challenge was brought by Michael Hardwick, a gay
man, and John and Mary Doe, a heterosexual couple.' 0' Ignoring the
fact that the challenged statute defined sodomy in physical, gender
neutral terms,'0 2 and that heterosexual couples could also be
prosecuted under the challenged state law,0 3 Justice White callously
mischaracterized the issue before the court as "whether the Federal
Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage
in sodomy."'10 4
By focusing sharply on homosexual sodomy, Justice White
managed to sidestep the issue of decisional privacy raised by
Hardwick, while reluctantly accepting the constitutional defensibility
99. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). The purpose of this section is
not to critique in depth the shortcomings of Bowers. There are many excellent
articles on that topic. See, e.g., Anne B. Goldstein, Comment, History,
Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the Hidden Determinants of
Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L. J. 1073 (1988). The aim of this article is, instead,
to trace the ever-widening effects that Bowers had on the rights of gays in the
military. In fact, the moral condemnation of sexual conduct between individuals of
the same gender in the military has much older roots. See, for example, Dronenburg
v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1396 (D.C. Cir. 1984), where Judge Robert Bork rejected
privacy and equal protection arguments in the case of a highly decorated gay officer
who had been discharged from the Navy. As the Supreme Court would later find in
Bowers, Bork drew a parallel between sexual conduct between consenting adults and
all other types of sexual conduct, presumably even rape and pedophilia, to support
the court's decision, by stating, "[w]e would find it impossible to conclude that a
right to homosexual conduct is 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty' unless any and all private sexual behavior falls within those categories, a
conclusion we are unwilling to draw." Id. (emphasis added).
100. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 189.
101. Id. at 188, 188 n.2.
102. See id. at 190.
103. See id
104. Id.
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of a long line of precedent that supported Hardwick's position. 0 5
Perhaps the most damaging feature of the opinion was Justice White's
aggressive stance regarding the immorality of homosexuality and gay
relationships. Instead of grouping gays, as the dissent did, with
consenting heterosexual adults defending a right to engage in intimate
relationships,' 0 6 Justice White aligned gay people with those who
commit adultery, incest and other sexual crimes. 10
7
Justice White's brutal debasement and condemnation of gay
relationships was exceeded by Justice Burger, who, in a terse
concurring opinion, relied on vague historical references and a
gratuitous citation to Blackstone's description of sodomy 10 8 to
continue to frame the issue before the Court as one involving criminal
conduct of the worst kind.'0 9 The majority thus utilized the status of
the Court as the Nation's moral compass to stigmatize gay people as
the moral equivalents of adulterers who betray the sacred institution of
marriage, as the moral equivalents of incestuous relatives who violate
children's trust, and as criminals of the most reprehensible kind, with
devastating results.
105. See id. at 190-91.
106. Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun, with whom
Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice Stevens stated, "[T]his case is about
'the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men,'
namely, 'the right to be left alone."' Id. (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). Blackmun added:
The fact that individuals define themselves in a significant way through
their intimate sexual relationships with others suggests, in a Nation as
diverse as ours, that there may be many "right" ways of conducting those
relationships, and that much of he richness of a relationship will come
from the freedom an individual has to choose the form and nature of those
intensely personal bonds.
Id. at 205.
107. Id. at 195-96 (majority opinion) ("And if respondent's submission is
limited to the voluntary sexual conduct between consenting adults, it would be
difficult, except by fiat, to limit the claimed right to homosexual conduct while
leaving exposed to prosecution adultery, incest, and other sexual crimes even though
they are committed at home.").
108. Id. at 197 (Burger, J., concurring) ("Blackstone described 'the infamous
crime against nature' as an offense of 'deeper malignity' than rape, a heinous act
'the very mention of which is a disgrace to human nature,' and 'a crime not fit to be
named."').
109. See id. at 196-97.
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The majority's negative characterization of the issue before the
Court and its aggressive moral condemnation of gay relationships
created an ever-widening shadow from which it became nearly
impossible to escape. The Court's condemnation of gay people and
their relationships, and its conflation of status and criminal conduct,
provided much of the fuel for legal opinions and legislative initiatives
that simply acquiesced to heterosexual prejudices." 0 The Court's
condemnation of gay relationships took added significance after other
arguments such as the protection of public health from the spread of
disease such as AIDS,"' and the protection of society from
psychologically pathological homosexuals," 2 or the claim that gay
men and women were especially susceptible to blackmail, 1 3 were
systematically defeated by gay rights advocates, or abandoned by anti-
gay forces." 4
Significantly, and somewhat ironically, despite the fact that many
of those arguments were defeated by gay-rights advocates or
abandoned by the military, Bower's powerful moralistic disapproval
110. See, e.g., Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir.
1989). In this case, the appeals court noted that Bowers permitted the criminalization
of "the most common sexual practices of homosexuals." Id. at 1076, n.10. See also
Francisco Valdez, Sexual Minorities in the Military: Charting the Constitutional
Frontiers of Status and Conduct, 27 CREIGHTON L. REv. 381 (1994).
111. See, for example, Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. 13-16 (D.D.C. 1991),
where Judge Gasch ruled that the regulations regarding forced separation of
homosexuals were rationally related to the military interest in protecting soldiers and
sailors from AIDS, a position that had not been advanced by the military in that
case.
112. See generally GARY L. LEHRING, OFFICIALLY GAY 84-98 (2003) (tracing
the military's reliance on psychologists and psychiatrists who sought an institutional
role in the military by claiming that they could best detect homosexuals for
separation).
113. In Able, the government affirmatively rejected the old myths of
homosexuality as a mental illness, or personality disorder that had been used from
the 1920's through the 1960's to exclude homosexuals from serving in the military.
Able v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 968, 973 (E.D.N.Y 1995), vacated, 88 F.3d
1280 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 155 F.3d 628, (2d Cir. 1998). The government also
rejected prior policy statements that called for the dismissal of homosexuals because
they presented the potential for "breaches of security," that may arise if closet
homosexuals were blackmailed. Id. at 974. It also rejected earlier statements calling
for the dismissal of homosexuals based on public health. Id.
114. Id. at 973-74.
[Vol. 44
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of gay relationships left little choice but to argue, in some cases, that
service members who wished to remain in the military after being
identified had no propensity or intent to engage in intimate sexual
conduct with people of the same gender during their military
service.' That tactic, though sometimes successful,"16 helped to
legitimize the military's discriminatory practices against gays and
conceded (at least in the eyes of defenders of the policy and many
courts) the moral high ground to the military's decision to defer to the
biases of a minority of heterosexuals. Interestingly, those tactics were
also inconsistent with arguments made with great force by gay rights
advocates in Bowers regarding the importance of sexual expression."i7
Since the day it was handed down, Bowers has influenced
virtually every decision involving gays in the military, whether under
the old ban or the new policy. 118 In Schowengerdt v. United States, a
115. See, for example, Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en
banc), where a gay Midshipman brought suit against the Military Academy. Steffan
conceded that the military may discharge service members who engage in
homosexual conduct, id. at 685, but argued, unsuccessfully, that the mere act of
identifying himself as gay did not mean that he would engage in sexual conduct with
men, id. at 687. See also Matlovich v. Sec'y of the Air Force, 591 F.2d 852, 859
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that the plaintiff was entitled to an explanation regarding
why an exception to service by homosexuals under "unusual circumstances" did not
apply to him).
116. See, for example, Meinholdv. U.S. Dep't of Def , 34 F.3d. 1469, 1479-80
(9th Cir. 1994), where the Ninth Circuit ruled that a mere statement of sexual
identification, without a "concrete, expressed desire to commit homosexual acts,"
did not indicate an intent to engage in homosexual conduct.
117. See Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 262 (8th Cir. 1996) (referencing an
amicus brief filed by the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund in Bowers,
where Lambda had argued "'for gay people, sexuality and their sexual orientation
play an especially central role in the definition of self.... [Sodomy laws] impose an
added burden on gay people, blocking their sense of self as well as their sexual
fulfillment"').
118. The influence of Bowers was palpable during the Congressional hearings
on "Don't Ask, Don't Tell." During an exchange with Senator John Kerry, who
supported lifting the ban, Senator Strom Thurmond stated: "[h]omosexuals practice
sodomy. The Code of Military Justice and many states have provisions against
sodomy. How would you reconcile the situation with homosexuals in the military?"
Policy Concerning Homosexuality In the Armed Forces: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Armed Servs., 103 Cong. 493 (1993) (statement of Sen. Strom Thurmond,
Member, S. Comm. on Armed Serv.). Senator Kerry responded: "[m]ake it
consistent for heterosexuals and homosexuals. Whatever the standard is going to be
25
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case that arose under the former gay ban, the Ninth Circuit declared
that a substantive due process challenge to the gay ban that existed
prior to "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" was foreclosed by Bowers."1
9
Similarly, Woodward v. United States,120 Steffan v. Perry,12 1 Ben-
Shalom v. Marsh,122 and Pruitt v. Cheney,123 all relied heavily on
Bowers to reject challenges to the gay ban that existed prior to "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell." The Ninth Circuit reiterated this position in 1997
under the new policy in Holmes v. California Army National
Guard.124 The Ninth Circuit again reached the same conclusion in
Phillips v. Perry.125 Able v. United States and other cases continued to
preserve and expand the legacy of Bowers by collapsing a person's
identity into homosexual sexual conduct. 1
26
The most common thread in those cases has been the ease with
which courts have turned statements of sexual orientation
identification into powerful indicators of the person's propensity to
and apply it appropriately." Id. (statement of Sen. John Kerry, Member, S. Comm.
on Armed Serv.). Thurmond replied: "[h]eterosexuals do not practice sodomy'
Homosexuals do. Id.
119. Schowengerdt v. United States, 944 F.2d 483, 490 (9th Cir. 1991).
120. Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Relying on
Bowers to deny claims of due process and equal protection in a military discharge
involving a gay naval officer, the court in Woodward stated, "[a]fter Hardwick it
cannot logically be asserted that discrimination against homosexuals is
constitutionally infirm. We agree with the court in Padula v. Webster that 'there can
hardly be more palpable discrimination against a class than making the conduct that
defines the class criminal."' Id. at 1076 (quoting Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97,
103 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
121. In this case, the court collapsed a statement about sexual identity with the
propensity or desire to engage in homosexual conduct. Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677,
689-90 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
122. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989). Relying on Bowers,
the Seventh Circuit rejected an equal protection challenge to the ban, declaring that
the class of homosexual persons could not be entitled to heightened scrutiny when
the conduct defining the class could, constitutionally, be criminalized. Id. at 464.
123. Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160, 1166 n.5 (9th Cir. 1991).
124. Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997).
125. Phillips v. Perry, 106 F. 3d 1420, 1429 (9th Cir. 1997).
126. See Able v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 969, 974-76 (E.D.N.Y. 1995),
vacated, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 155 F.3d 628 (2nd Cir. 1998)
(describing "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" as a prohibition on homosexual conduct, but
defining conduct as "statements" of sexual orientation).
438 [Vol. 44
26
California Western Law Review, Vol. 44 [2007], No. 2, Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol44/iss2/3
2008] DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL: A DYING POLICY ON THE PRECIPICE 439
engage in homosexual conduct, easily fending off arguments based on
a person's willingness to forgo sex during military service. Not
surprisingly, while it is possible that a small number of service
members can remain celibate during their military service, courts have
relied on common experience to find that celibacy is virtually
impossible to sustain.127 Therefore, attempts to disprove a relationship
between statements of sexual orientation and the propensity to engage
in sexual conduct with persons of the same gender have been largely
futile. 128
Further, it takes much more than a promise of celibacy to avoid
discharge under the policy. The military's ability to expel gay
personnel is enhanced by a definition of homosexual conduct that is so
broad that virtually any touch of another person of the same gender, or
even words of sexual identification can provide grounds to investigate
and eventually discharge a member from military service. The statute
sets an extremely low threshold of proof for intent or propensity to
engage in homosexual sexual conduct. While "homosexual acts"
appear to be narrowly defined as "any bodily contact, actively
undertaken or passively permitted, between members of the same sex
for the purpose of satisfying sexual desires,"'129 the argument that the
person did not intend to satisfy "sexual desires" by merely showing
affection for another is foreclosed by a broad definition in a
subsequent subparagraph, which adds, "any bodily contact which a
127. In Steffan, a case challenging the ban that existed before "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell," the court reasoned that:
[i]t is sufficient to recognize that the government's presumption, as
embodied in the Academy regulations, is certainly rational given that the
human sexual drive is enormously powerful and that an open declaration
that one is a homosexual is a rather reliable indication as to the direction
of one's drive.
Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 690 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see also Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d
at 464.
128. See generally Diane H. Mazur, The Unknown Soldier: A Critique of
"Gays in the Military" Scholarship and Litigation, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 223
(1996) (criticizing the approach to litigation that relies on the fiction that the service
member does not intend to engage in homosexual conduct during his or her military
service). Indeed, attempts to argue that the service person, having declared a gay
sexual orientation, would then be able to remain celibate throughout his or her
service in the military have generally failed. See, e.g., Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 464.
129. 10 U.S.C. § 654(f)(3)(A) (2006).
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reasonable person would understand to demonstrate a propensity or
intent to engage in an act described in subparagraph (A)."'130
Subparagraph (B), thus provides a blanket prohibition of any contact,
not just those undertaken for the purpose of satisfying sexual desires.
As a result, touching the shoulder of a person of the same gender, or
holding hands however slightly in a show of affection may lead to
investigation and eventual discharge.'3 '
The second most common thread is the courts' willingness to
defer to military judgment that the presence of known homosexuals in
the military will undermine unit preparedness, cohesion and morale.
In support of this conclusion, courts have relied heavily on anecdotes
and personal opinions contained within the legislative history of
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" from military and congressional leaders,
while ignoring mountains of evidence to the contrary.1 32
Significantly, as it deferred to the personal beliefs, anecdotal
stories and personal fears of military leaders, Congress ignored
comprehensive and careful analysis performed by the RAND
Corporation that had been conducted at great cost to thegovernment. 133 Tl,- PR AND oA proved A 1hab ...... r 1 i.-.. ..... .. oJM ,Y r,.,,,.,,- 11"t LIL, -x -Y for unit
cohesion and morale is properly placed on military leadership, not on
individual interpersonal dynamics.' 34 Indeed, RAND identified
numerous studies that demonstrated that the most important
determinant of unit morale is the successful accomplishment of a
mission, not whether the individual members of the unit have formed
interpersonal bonds, or even whether they personally like each
other.' 35 Those findings are supported by numerous studies on group
cohesion performed in military and civilian settings. 136
130. Id. § 654(f)(3)(B).
131. "But statements are not the only means for discharge. Those that don't
speak about their sexual orientation may still be discharged if it is discovered that
they engage in or have a propensity to engage in prohibited conduct." Thomasson v.
Perry, 895 F. Supp. 820, 825 (E.D. Va. 1995).
132. Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 929 (4th Cir. 1996).
133. 139 CONG. REC. S 11157-04 (1993) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
134. RAND STUDY, supra note 27, at 29-30.
135. See id. at 303.
136. Elizabeth Kier has found that "[p]olitical, strategic, operational, and
tactical factors such as the quality of training, intelligence, and supply capabilities,
as well as the military's objectives and strategy, contribute to battlefield
440 [Vol. 44
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V. A SEARCHING RATIONAL BASIS TEST
Equal protection challenges to "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" based on
intermediate or strict scrutiny have routinely been rejected. 137 After
determining that the appropriate level of scrutiny is the rational basis
test, courts have had no trouble turning back challenges by simply
deferring to the judgment of a shrinking number of military leaders as
"rational." In Dallas v. Stanglin,138 Justice Rehnquist described a
formidable obstacle to a successful challenge of legislation under the
traditional rational basis test. Justice Rehnquist noted that "rational
basis scrutiny . . . is the most relaxed and tolerant form of judicial
scrutiny."' 139 Quoting New Orleans v. Dukes140 Rehnquist stated that
"[i]n the local economic sphere, it is only the invidious discrimination,
the wholly arbitrary act, which cannot stand consistently with the
Fourteenth Amendment."' 141 An even narrower version of rational
basis analysis was described by Justice Clarence Thomas in Federal
Communications Commission v. Beach Communications, Inc.,
142
where he stated, "[i]n areas of social and economic policy, a statutory
classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes
fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal
protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of
facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification."'' 43
effectiveness." Elizabeth Kier, Homosexuals in the U.S. Military: Open Intergration
and Combat Effectiveness, 23 INT'L SECURITY 5, 8 (1995). In addition to those
factors, leadership seemed to be the most critical. Id. Kier's sophisticated analysis
has revealed that more support exists for the hypothesis that the causal connection
runs from success to unit cohesion, rather than from unit cohesion to success. Id. at
13.
137. See, e.g., Selland v. Perry, 905 F. Supp. 260 (D. Md. 1995).
138. Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989).
139. Id. at 26. ("[A] state does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely
because the classification made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has
some 'reasonable basis' it does not offend the Constitution simply because the
classification 'is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results
in some inequality." (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)).
140. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
141. Dallas, 490 U.S. at 27 (quoting New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297,
303-04 (1976)).
142. FCC v. Beach Commc'n, Inc., 508 U.S. 305 (1993).
143. Id. at 313.
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According to Justice Thomas, "because we never require a legislature
to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute, it is entirely irrelevant
for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the
challenged distinction actually motivated the legislature. 144
Completing a grim picture, Thomas added, "[i]n other words, a
legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be
based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical
data." 145 However, an emerging body of law that calls for searching
inquiry into the legitimacy of discriminatory classifications that do not
involve a traditional suspect class or a traditional fundamental interest
has taken a firm hold in the modem legal landscape.
A. Exceptions to Traditional Rational Basis Review
In a line of landmark cases, the Supreme Court has concluded that
the challenged classification could not possibly have served a
legitimate public purpose; United States Department of Agriculture v.
Moreno,146 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,147 Romer v.
Evans 148 and most recently Lawrence v. Texas149 form the core of that
doctrine.
Moreno involved an act of Congress to amend the Food Stamp
Act of 1964.150 To accomplish the goals of stimulating the agricultural
economy and alleviating hunger and malnutrition,' 51 Congress chose
to exclude from the food stamp program any household containing
unrelated individuals. 5 2 Applying a "searching" rational basis test, the
Court determined that whether a person is related to other members of
a household was clearly irrelevant,' 53 and, indeed, ran contrary to the
policies behind the statute. Relying on a Conference Report and a
statement on the floor of the Senate, the Court concluded that the
144. Id. at 315.
145. Id.
146. U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
147. City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
148. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
149. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
150. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 529.
151. Id. at 533.
152. Id. at 530.
153. Id. at 534.
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purpose of the 1971 amendment to the Food Stamp Act was to
exclude "hippies" and "hippie communes" from the food stamp
program. 5 4 The Court then declared that "a bare congressional desire
to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
government interest."'1
55
In Cleburne, the Court set aside a zoning ordinance that
specifically required group homes for people with mental illnesses to
get a special use permit while freely permitting the operation of other
care and multiple-dwelling facilities. 156 While refusing to categorize
people with mental illness as a quasi-suspect class,' 57 the Court
nonetheless ruled that they were protected from this type of invidious
discrimination.' 58 Invoking Zobel v. Williams'59 and United States
Dept. ofAgriculture v. Moreno,160 the Court held that "[t]he state may
not rely on a classification whose relationship to its asserted goal is so
attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational."'' 6'
Importantly, while ratifying the doctrine from Zobel and Moreno
that "some objectives-such as 'a bare . . . desire to harm a politically
unpopular group'-are not legitimate state interests,"' 62 the court
added another layer of analysis where those motives could not be
outwardly identified. The Court's search of the record did not appear
to reveal a "bare desire" to harm people with mental retardation.
However, the Court found that the justifications offered by the City
Council for requiring a special use permit for a group home for
mentally retarded people and not for other similar uses were based on
stereotypes of people with mental retardation and paternalism toward
that group. 63 The Court also dismissed concerns over population
concentration, street congestion, fire hazards, and danger to other
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985).
157. Id. at 442.
158. Id. at446.
159. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
160. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528.
161. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446.
162. Id. at 447 (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534).
163. See id at 448-50.
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residents, 64 concluding that the permit requirement was based on
nothing more than irrational prejudice against people with mental
illness.'1 65 Finding that such negative attitudes and fears do not provide
legitimate reasons for discrimination, the Court concluded that the
ordinance violated equal protection, even under the rational basis
test. 166
Significantly, concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part,
Justice Marshall reminded the Court that its rational basis analysis was
"most assuredly not the rational basis test of Williamson v. Lee
Optical of Oklahoma, Inc."'167 Instead, it was a much more searching
inquiry into the legitimacy of the justifications given by the state for
its classifications. '68
In Romer, the Court declared unconstitutional an amendment to
the Colorado Constitution that prohibited all state and local
governments from enacting laws designed to protect people from
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 69 Amendment 2 was
the result of a statewide referendum that had taken place in response
to a number of recently enacted city ordinances banning
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in housing,
employment, education, public accommodations, and health and
welfare services.17 ° Amendment 2 repealed the ordinances and also
prohibited all legislative, executive and judicial action at any state
level designed to protect the class.' 7 ' Relying primarily on voting
164. Id. at 450.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 448.
167. Id. at 458 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
168. See id. at 460.
169. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
170. Id. at 623-24.
171. Amendment 2 read as follows:
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments,
nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school
districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statue, regulation, ordinance or
policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct,
practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or
entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status,
quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination.
COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 30b, held unconstitutional by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996).
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rights cases, the Colorado Supreme Court held that Amendment 2 was
subject to strict scrutiny, finding that the law violated equal protection
by depriving gays and lesbians the opportunity to participate in the
political process. 7 2 On remand, the state failed to convince the trial
court that the statute was narrowly tailored to serve compelling state
interests.173 The trial court enjoined Amendment 2, and the state
supreme court affirmed the ruling.1
7 4
Relying on a searching rational basis analysis, the Court agreed
that Amendment 2 violated the equal protection clause. The state held
that Amendment 2 was merely designed to place gays and lesbians in
the same position as all other persons, by denying homosexuals
special rights. 175 Finding such a reading implausible, the Court
pointed out the sweeping nature of Amendment 2.176 The Amendment
was not only intended to nullify specific legal protections, 177 but was
also designed to forbid reinstatement of those laws and policies,
putting gays and lesbians in a solitary class.' 7
8
Importantly, the Court recognized the modem trend in anti-
discrimination laws that were designed to remedy Congress' inability
to protect individuals against some types of discrimination.' 79 Noting
that Colorado's state and local governments had passed many public
accommodations laws prohibiting discrimination against non-suspect
groups, 180 the Court stressed that Amendment 2 not only barred
homosexuals from securing protection under the public
accommodation laws, but also "nullified specific legal protections for
this targeted class in all transactions in housing, sale of real estate,
172. Romer, 517 U.S. at 625.
173. Id. at 625-26.
174. Id. at 626.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 626-27.
177. Id. at 626.
178. Id. at 627.
179. See id at 627-28.
180. Id. at 628-29 (listing non-suspect categories that had been the subject of
non-discrimination measures, such as "age, military status, marital status,
pregnancy, parenthood, custody of a minor child, political affiliation, physical or
mental disability ... and, in recent times, sexual orientation").
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insurance, health and welfare services, private education, and
employment."' 8
1
The Court also noted that Amendment 2 could be read to deprive
gays and lesbians of the protection of more general laws." 2 As the
Court explained, "in the systematic administration of these laws, an
official must determine whether homosexuality is an arbitrary and,
thus, forbidden basis for decision." '183 Such a decision would itself
constitute a policy prohibiting discrimination based on homosexuality
under the amendment, 8 4 denying homosexuals safe harbor even in
laws of general application.' 85 Rejecting the state's position that the
law did nothing more than deny homosexuals "special rights,"' 6 the
Court found nothing "special" in the rights denied by the
Amendment. 87 Instead, the Court pointed out that Amendment 2
denied homosexuals basic protections taken for granted by most
people.' 88 The Amendment thus created a class of outsiders, with few
basic protections.
The Court concluded that Amendment 2 did not satisfy rational
basis analysis because the Amendment imposed a "broad and
,-A.C',PP - , .-A A i. 1; , o; , ,189 tk,,,. ,-rt- , l,,-,
udiffcrcntiatd ,disability on a single named group." The Cor a.L".s
noted that the breadth of the Amendment 2 was "so discontinuous
with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seem[ed]
inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects."' 9 0
With regard to the first point, the Court stressed that "even in the
ordinary equal protection case calling for the most deferential of
standards, we insist on knowing the relation between the classification
adopted and the object to be attained."' 91 Citing a number of cases
examining classifications that were ultimately upheld under the
181. !d. at 629.
182. Id. at 630.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at631.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 632.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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rationality test because they were narrowly drawn and grounded in
sufficient facts to enable the Court to ascertain a relationship between
the classifications and the purpose they served, the Court stated that
such an inquiry ensures that "classifications are not drawn for the
purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law."
'1 92
The Court's analysis provided some insight into a number of
factors that might provoke a more searching inquiry under that test.
The Court noted that Amendment 2 was both "too narrow and too
broad" in its identification of people by a single trait and its blanket
denial of protection to that group.'9 3 Characterizing the Amendment as
unprecedented, the Court stated that the absence of precedent was
itself instructive: "' [d]iscrimination of an unusual character especially
suggest careful consideration to determine whether they are obnoxious
to the constitutional provision." ' 194 Stressing that laws that purport to
achieve equal protection through indiscriminate imposition of
inequalities run contrary to our constitutional tradition of equal
protection,' 95 the Court concluded that a law making it "more difficult
for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the
government is itself a denial of equal protection."196
On the second point, the Court concluded that Amendment 2, and
laws like it, "raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage
imposed is borne of animosity toward the class of persons affected. 197
In support of Amendment 2 the state had offered two justifications.
The first was "respect for others citizens' freedom of association, and
in particular the liberties of landlords or employers who have personal
or religious objections to homosexuality."' 98 And, the second was the
state's "interest in conserving resources to fight discrimination against
other groups."' 99 Focusing on the severity of the harm inflicted upon
192. Id. at 632-33.
193. Id. at 633.
194. Id. (quoting Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37-38
(1928)).
195. See id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 634.
198. Id. at 635.
199. Id.
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homosexuals, 20 0 and stressing that the extreme breadth of the measure
was so far removed from those justifications,20 ' the Court rejected the
state's argument.20 2
Lawrence involved a challenge to a state statute banning same-sex
sodomy.20 3 Finding for the petitioners and against the state, the Court
ruled that the statute violated the petitioners' liberty interests under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,20 4 and overruled
Bowers.20 5 Concurring in the judgment but declining to join the Court
in overruling Bowers, Justice O'Connor argued that the case was more
properly decided under the equal protection doctrine. 20 6 Relying on
Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer, O'Connor reminded the Court that
"some objectives, such as 'a bare . . . desire to harm a politically
unpopular group,' are not legitimate state interests. 20 7 Noting that the
state's justification was the promotion of morality, O'Connor argued
that moral disapproval by itself does not constitute the legitimate state
interest required to justify a ban on homosexual sodomy but not
heterosexual sodomy.20 8 Scrutinizing the justifications offered by the
state, O'Connor reasoned that because the law was so seldom
enforced with respect to "private, consensual acts, the law serves more
as a statement of dislike and disapproval against homosexuals than as
a tool to stop criminal behavior. . . . '[R]ais[ing] the inevitable
inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward
the class of persons affected."' 20 9 O'Connor therefore would have
reached the same result, but with a completely different analysis,
confirming the viability of the exceptions to deferential rational basis
review reflected in Moreno, Cleburne and Romer.
Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer illustrate attempts to legislate
against a perceived moral or character flaw that does not generally
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
204. Id. at 579.
205. Id. at 578.
206. Id. at 579 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 583.
209. Id. (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996)).
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exist in the realm of "traditional" (but sadly uninformed) societal
values. The key in those cases is the Court's rejection of unsupported
explanations for the discriminatory state action. A mere religious
objection to homosexuals in Romer did not justify state action that
denied basic legal protections and allowed invidious discrimination
against that group.2 0 The fear of people with mental illness did not
support state discrimination in Cleburne.211 And the image of the
moral superiority of a nuclear family versus a household composed
partly of unrelated people did not support denying a most basic public
benefit in the form of food stamps in Moreno.
In each of those cases, the invidiousness of the discrimination and
the magnitude of the harm on a politically unpopular group moved the
Court to reject the unsupported justifications offered by the state. In
those cases, if the statute is "a status-based enactment divorced from
any factual context from which [courts] could discern a relationship to
legitimate state interest, ' 212 the statute must be found to violate the
rationality test under equal protection. Significantly, those cases have
generated a growing array of lower court decisions consistent with
those principles.213
Challenges to the military's exclusionary policies based on
suspect class status or a fundamental right to privacy have failed to
persuade courts to apply a heightened level of scrutiny. Absent a
210. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
211. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985).
212. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
213. The following cases relied on the combination of Moreno, Cleburne, and
Romer to justify a searching rational basis analysis: Stemler v. City of Florence, 126
F.3d 856 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that selective prosecution on the basis of sexual
orientation violates the Equal Protection Clause); Weaver v. Nebo School District,
29 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (D. Utah 2003) (holding that retaliation against teacher-coach's
public expression of her sexual orientation violates Equal Protection Clause);
Esperanza Peace and Justice Ctr. v. City of San Antonio, 316 F. Supp. 2d 433 (W.D.
Texas 2001) (invalidating decision by City of San Antonio to remove funding to
plaintiff because of its support of gay and lesbian issues). A key cite search of the
three cases separately revealed that Moreno has been cited negatively ten times, and
has been referenced positively 426 times; Cleburne has been referenced negatively
thirty-one times and positively 1983 times; and that Romer has been cited negatively
fourteen times, and positively 278 times. Though a careful analysis of those trends is
beyond the scope of this article, they tend to suggesting strongly that, contrary to
some scholars' pessimism, searching rational basis review is alive and growing in
the lower courts.
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suspect class or a fundamental right, courts have stressed that the
proper constitutional test is traditional rational basis analysis.
Ironically, to make that point, several courts have relied on cases that
stand for exceptions to traditional rational basis review such as
Cleburne and Romer.2 14 While appearing to rely on those cases, some
courts have concluded that heightened judicial scrutiny does not apply
to constitutional challenges to the policy. However, rather than apply a
searching analysis, courts have relied on a run-of-the-mill rational
basis test, simply deferring to military judgment as "rational" without
conducting an analysis of the policy or its supporting rationale. Those
courts have acted as if a searching rational basis test does not exist.
B. Lawrence in the Military Context
A growing number of cases in the lower courts reveal that the
viability of "searching rational basis analysis" to invalidate legislation
or decisions designed specifically to target politically unpopular
groups is here to stay. Importantly, military courts themselves have
recognized that Lawrence calls for the application of a "searching
rational basis test" to "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," contradicting
assertions made by civilian courts that Lawrence does not apply in the
military context. 215 Indeed, military courts have ruled that some of the
military's policies must be analyzed against the more demanding
searching rational basis standard. In 2003, Eric P. Marcum, a
Technical Sergeant for the U.S. Air Force, was convicted of a
violation of Article 125 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice for
engaging in consensual sexual relations with a man under his
command.216 Marcum appealed his conviction, arguing that his
conviction should be set aside based on Lawrence.217 While upholding
214. See, e.g., Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir.
1989) (citing Cleburne for the proposition that "[t]he Navy's challenged practice
regarding homosexuals need only be rationally related to a permissible
governmental end to pass constitutional muster").
215. See, for example, Cook v. Rumsfeld, 429 F. Supp. 2d 385, 395, 400 (D.
Mass. 2006), where District Judge George O'Toole ruled that Lawrence v. Texas
does not require that challenges to "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" be reviewed under a
heightened standard, and that the policy is Constitutional under a run-of-the-mill
rational basis standard.
216. United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, 201 (C.A.A.F. 2004).
217. Id. at 202.
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Marcum's conviction of sex with a subordinate who was in a military
position where "'consent might not easily be refused, ' ' 21 8 the court
made clear that the holding in Lawrence applies in the military
context.
2 19
In opposition to Marcum's argument that Lawrence had
invalidated Article 125 as a violation of due process, the government
argued that Lawrence is not applicable to the military context because
of the distinct and separate character of military life as recognized by
the Supreme Court in Parker v. Levy. 220 In what may be construed as
an attempt to preserve the most damaging part of Bowers, the
government insisted that because the Supreme Court in Lawrence did
not expressly create a fundamental right to engage in homosexual
sodomy, the issue was most properly analyzed under the rational basis
standard.22' According to the government, under that standard, Article
125 passed constitutional muster because it was designed to
criminalize conduct that "'create[s] an unacceptable risk to the high
standards of morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion,"' as
recognized by Congress in 10 U.S.C. § 654 (a)(15). 222
In addition to arguing for the lowest standard of scrutiny, the
government asked the court to ignore Lawrence because that case did
not involve people in uniform, 223 overlooking the fact that the
military's anti-gay policies are rooted firmly in another civilian case
that did not involve people in uniform-Bowers. 24 Though it
conceded that the Constitution applies to members of the Armed
Forces, the government argued that Lawrence only applies to civilian
conduct.225
An alternative argument was designed to confine Lawrence within
the limits established by the Hardwick decision and to continue to
collapse sexual orientation into the act of sodomy. To limit Lawrence,
the government urged the court to defer to military judgment on the
218. Id. at 203 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003)).
219. Id. at 207.
220. Id. at 205-206 (citing Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974)).
221. See id. at 206.
222. Id. (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(15) (2006)).
223. Id.
224. See id.
225. Id.
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matter of the criminalization of sodomy by contending that Congress
definitely addressed homosexual sodomy when it enacted 10 U.S.C.
654.226 The government misconstrued Finding 15 of "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" by arguing that Congress "not only prohibited sodomy
through article 125 ... but ... determined in 1993 through 10 U.S.C.
§ 654 that homosexuality, and, therefore, sodomy was incompatible
,,227 uet obndwt h
with military service. That argument, combined with the
government's assertion that Lawrence had reaffirmed that the right to
engage in homosexual sodomy was not a fundamental right, invited
the court to reintroduce the overruled and discredited Bowers
doctrine.228
Importantly, the government's argument also revealed its view of
the true meaning of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell." As it stands, "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell" has been taken to mean that statements revealing
sexual orientation status equal homosexual conduct. However, "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell" does not call for the conclusion that homosexual
status equals sodomy. Nonetheless, the government continued to
advance the argument that homosexual orientation is the equivalent of
crimina! sexual conduct.
In contrast, the appellant and several amici, argued for strict
scrutiny of the military's regulation on sodomy.229 In their view,
Article 125 suffered from the same constitutional deficiencies as the
statute in Lawrence.23 ° According to appellant and the amici, the
Supreme Court placed the interests at issue in Lawrence, within the
realm of its privacy jurisprudence. 231' By overruling Hardwick, they
argued, the Supreme Court effectively decided that private,
consensual, sexual conduct is a constitutionally protected liberty
interest, warranting strict scrutiny.
232
The court's independent analysis of Lawrence was consistent with
the arguments raised by the appellant, and revealed the wisdom of
Lawrence even as applied in the military context. Significantly, the
226. Id.
227. Id. (emphasis added).
228. See id.
229. Id. at 204.
230. See id.
231. Id.
232. See id
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court refused the government's invitation to reintroduce Bowers into
the equation by rejecting its characterization of Lawrence. Instead, the
court agreed with the appellant's argument that the Supreme Court
had placed Lawrence squarely within its substantive due process
jurisprudence, and declared that the holding in Lawrence was not
about whether Lawrence had created a fundamental right to engage in
homosexual sodomy, but rather whether "'the petitioners were free as
adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution. ,,233
With respect to the criminalization of sodomy among consenting
adults, the court quoted approvingly language from Lawrence that
stated:
The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent
from each other, engaged in sexual practices 'common to a
homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for their
private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control
their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their
right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full
right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the
government. "It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a
realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter."
The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can
justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of an
individual.234
Reflecting the lack of specificity in Lawrence regarding the
proper standard of Constitutional review applied in that case, the court
noted that good arguments could be advanced that Lawrence applied
rational basis analysis, and that the right at stake in that case was
deemed fundamental by the Supreme Court. 235 The court also
observed that, in response to Lawrence, some courts have applied
rational basis analysis while others have applied strict scrutiny. 236
While the court in Lawrence placed the liberty interest at stake
233. Id. at 203 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003)).
234. Id. (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (2003)).
235. See id. at 204.
236. Id.
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"within the Griswold line of cases, it did not expressly identify the
liberty interest at stake as a fundamental right.238 The military court
therefore chose not to presume the existence of such a fundamental
right, especially in the military context.
239
However, while the court chose not to apply strict scrutiny, it also
declined to apply run-of-the mill rational basis analysis. 240 Instead, the
court concluded that Lawrence requires the application of searching
rational basis analysis to Section 125.241 Since Marcum, at least two
other cases in the U.S. Army Court of Criminal Appeals have resulted
in the recognition that Lawrence identifies a liberty interest and the
right to engage in private, consensual, sexual conduct without
government intervention. Pursuant to Lawrence, the U.S. Army Court
of Criminal Appeals in those cases overturned convictions for
consensual sodomy among heterosexuals.242
C. Analysis of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" under a
Searching Rational Basis Test
One of the most scholarly expositions of the one-sided game of
semantics manifested in "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" was conducted by
Judge Eugene H. Nickerson of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of New York in Able v. United States.243 Judge Nickerson's
powerful opinion demonstrated the way in which a discriminatory
policy such as "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" can be dismantled under a
searching analysis. Although the opinion was vacated, Judge
Nickerson's reasoning is still illustrative to show how the policy could
not withstand searching rational basis.
In Able, six members of the military, whose only violation was to
state that they were homosexual, argued that the policy violated their
237. Id. at 205.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See id.
241. Id.
242. See, e.g., United States v. Bullock, No. ARMY 20030534, 2006 WL
3490404 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2004).
243. Able v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 968 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), vacated, 88
F.3d 1280 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998).
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First Amendment and equal protection rights.244 Though Nickerson
did not identify a constitutional standard, his opinion clearly shows
that the policy would not survive scrutiny under a searching rational
basis analysis. To lay the foundation for his critique of the policy,
Nickerson first noted that the DOD directives, which the policy
operates from, assume that sexual orientation is no longer a bar to
military service.245 Secondly, Nickerson pointed out that the law was
designed to distinguish sexual orientation from sexual conduct with a
person of the same sex.246 Nickerson also noted that, according to the
DOD, that conduct is not limited to homosexual acts. 247 Such
"conduct" also includes statements by a person that demonstrate a
propensity to engage in homosexual acts.2 4 8 Nickerson recognized the
government's position that statements of identification such as "I am a
homosexual," "I am gay, .... I am a lesbian," and "I have a homosexual
orientation" give rise to a presumption that the person has. a propensity
to engage in homosexual acts, requiring discharge unless rebutted.249
Operating under the assumption that the directives distinguish
between homosexual orientation and "propensity" to engage in
homosexual acts, Nickerson found little guidance in the directives
regarding the manner in which a statement regarding sexual
orientation can signal a "propensity" to engage in homosexual acts.
Judge Nickerson focused on the tortured reasoning found in the
directives. 250 Nickerson wondered how an "orientation" can mean an
"abstract preference" to engage in homosexual acts if not revealed, but
if admitted becomes evidence of "likelihood" to commit acts requiring
discharge. 251
Judge Nickerson next demonstrated the manner in which the
military sought to continue its exclusionary practices while masking
those practices in apparently principled procedural technicalities that
244. Id. at 970, 972. The policy was also challenged based on vagueness, over-
breadth and intimate association-however, this article will restrict its analysis to
the First Amendment and equal protection challenges.
245. Id. at 971.
246. Id. at 975.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 971.
249. Id. at 972.
250. Id.
251. Id.
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provide little more than an illusion of protection. Nickerson found that
the legislative history of the Act revealed that Congress sought to
reach homosexual conduct simply because "'prohibition of
homosexual conduct in the military is deemed necessary"' by the
military.252 Nickerson noted that, according to Finding 15 of the Act
"the prohibition against such conduct is so necessary that even those
who have a mere 'propensity' to engage in that conduct must be
discharged., 253 Recognizing that the plaintiffs had done nothing more
than "acknowledge who they are," the judge stressed that the First
Amendment places a value on speech not only as an instrument by
which ideas may be exchanged but as "an expression of personal
dignity and integrity." 254
With respect to deference to the military in the area of military
policy, Nickerson was careful to distinguish between policy decisions
in the military context and the constitutionality of military decisions
when those decisions clash with individual liberties protected by the
Bill of Rights. Accordingly, Nickerson stressed that "[e]ven in the
military context, regulation of speech based on content survives
constitutional scrutiny only if it is 'no more than [what is] reasonably
necessary to protect [a] substantial government interest. '255
According to Nickerson, the legislative history of the Act shows
that the military had finally admitted to the ability of gays and lesbians
to serve their country honorably and admirably. 256 Further, Congress
had manifested confidence that homosexuals did not pose a danger to
unit cohesion by allowing them to join the military.257 Despite those
facts, Judge Nickerson noted with some dismay, homosexuals were
still required to conceal their sexual identity or risk discharge. 258
Characterizing the military's practice as punishment based on status,
Nickerson drew a parallel to Robinson v. California.259 In that case,
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 973 (quoting Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 355 (1980)) (alteration
in original).
256. See id. at 974.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 974.
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the Court rejected the argument that prosecution of an admitted
narcotics addict was justified on the theory that he had possessed or
would possess drugs.260 The court reasoned that the defendant's status
as an addict did not justify "an inference that he had possessed or in
the future would possess illegal drugs."26'
Judge Nickerson probed deeper into the Act's legislative history,
concluding that in order to avoid challenges based on status, the
drafters had devised a game of semantic gymnastics designed in such
a way that gay service members could never win.262 The policy,
according to the judge, was cleverly designed to avoid First
Amendment problems by defining conduct to include statements about
sexual orientation, thus transmogrifying statements about status into
admissions of misconduct, which the speaker would have a practically
insurmountable burden of disproving. 263
Judge Nickerson next demonstrated that a principled distinction
between the meaning of "orientation" and "propensity," the most
crucial terms of the exclusionary policy, simply did not exist in either
the Act or the directives. 264 Though the Act stated that "orientation"
would no longer be a bar to military service, the judge noted that those
who formulated the policy saw only a hypothetical distinction, and
that the directives equate a statement of "orientation" with an
admission or at least a "propensity. '' 265 Relying on testimony from the
Senate hearings, Nickerson stressed that those who simply admit to
being gay have, at best, "only a 'hypothetical' chance to escape
discharge." 266 The judge then wondered how a simple admission of
gay identity, an orientation that Congress has determined to be
innocuous, can be made to constitute proof of the case of an offense so
threatening to the military mission as to warrant removal,
characterizing such a consequence as "draconian. "267
260. Id.
261. Id. at 974.
262. Id. at 975.
263. Id. at 975-76.
264. Id. at 975.
265. See id.
266. Id. The Court characterized as anomalous three cases presented by the
government to demonstrate that the "propensity" presumption could be overcome.
Id. at 976.
267. Id. at 976.
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Judge Nickerson rejected as "aberrations stemming from a
dysfunctional application of the policy" three cases offered by the
government to prove that the presumptions could be overcome.
2 68
In one case the member had said "she thought she may be gay." In
another, the member had stated "I'm kind of confused about my
sexual preference." And, in the third the member had said he was a
homosexual only in what he thought was a confidential session
with a Navy counselor who tried to make him "comfortable" and
"as free as possible." 269
The most significant part of judge Nickerson's analysis, for
purposes of searching rational basis analysis under equal protection,
focused on the government's argument that the majority of
heterosexuals would prefer not to know that there were homosexuals
living among them, thus justifying the imposition of silence upon
gays. 270 Reasoning that the policy and its implementing directives
were designed in deference to an unspoken and unsupported prejudice
against homosexuals, Nickerson concluded that the Act was designed
to condemn homosexual status as an evil because of the reaction it
would generate among heterosexuals, who would react so as to
damage unit cohesion.27' Noting that the bulk of the anecdotal
testimony by military leaders who opposed the lifting of the ban
focused on the potential reactions of heterosexuals whose traditional
moral or religious values would put them at odds with gays and
lesbians, the judge also concluded that such animosity toward
homosexuals could only be based on irrational prejudices. 272 The
judge nevertheless engaged two arguments advanced by the
government. First, the argument that the policy "seeks to
accommodate the privacy interests of service members., 273 And,
second, that the policy somehow addresses the concern about "sexual
tension" in the unit.274
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. See id. at 976-77.
272. See id. at 977-78.
273. Id. at 978.
274. Id.
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Regarding the question of privacy, the judge noted that the
showers, latrines and barracks became no more private after the
passage of the Act than they were before it was passed.27 5 If,
Nickerson stressed, protection of the privacy of heterosexuals involves
protecting them from the stares of homosexuals when they are in the
shower, a policy requiring silence about sexual orientation would
hardly serve that purpose. 27 6 That is, if indeed there are homosexuals
who wish to peek at naked bodies in the showers, they may do so
when their orientation is a secret as when it is open.277 Thus, not
knowing the sexual identity of their service mates will give
heterosexuals reason to suspect everyone, hardly a circumstance likely
to increase "cohesion. " 27 8 The judge concluded that such a guarantee
of privacy would tend to mislead heterosexual service members, who
can hardly be unaware that because of the passage of the Act, gays
and lesbians are serving amongst them.279
The government's claim that the policy serves to reduce or
eliminate "sexual tension" in the barracks was also quickly dismantled
by Judge Nickerson. The existence of "sexual tension" was thus
attributed by the government to a belief that gays and lesbians will
naturally follow their "tendencies" and behave in improper ways that
will give rise to such tension. 280 Noting that the comment had already
been offered in support of the total ban, Nickerson pointed out that the
argument can hardly have force now that gays are allowed to serve. 281
Such conduct, according to the judge, is not more likely to occur
because homosexuals have acknowledged their orientation. 282
Moreover, Nickerson stressed, inappropriate behavior by a gay service
member, whether in the closet or not, is already controlled by the
military's regulations.2 8
3
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. See id.
279. See id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
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After referencing comprehensive studies by the RAND
Corporation and by the GAO which had concluded that the impact of
open homosexuals on military readiness would be minimal-the same
studies that had been ignored by Congress-Judge Nickerson
wondered about the absence of a discussion in the legislative history
of the Act about the impact on unit cohesion of forcing homosexuals
to assist in perpetuating a hoax on heterosexuals. As Nickerson saw it,
the policy adopted by Congress did not serve its stated purposes of
promoting unit morale and cohesion.284 At best, Nickerson stressed,
the policy represented a concession by Congress to the sensibilities of
some heterosexuals. 285 And, even if the First Amendment were to
tolerate the suppression of a truthful self-identification by
homosexuals, according to the judge, it would require a legislative
finding that the consequences of disclosure would be infinitely more
serious than anything revealed in the record before Congress.286
D. Evidence of Congressional and Military Animus in the Legislative
History of "Don't Ask, Don 't Tell"
The legislative history of -Don't Ask, Don't Tell" reveals a level
of animus toward gays and lesbians that far surpasses the degree of
animus cited by the Supreme Court in Cleburne, Moreno, and perhaps
even Romer to justify the application of a searching rational basis
test.287 Significantly, the incandescent level of animus present in the
deliberation of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" has not been the subject of
much discussion in the many legal challenges to the policy. A careful
look at the legislative history provides ample support for Judge
Nickerson's conclusion that the policy was designed to do little more
than defer to the unfounded prejudices of military and political
opponents. The next discussion of the policy in Congress and further
legal challenges to the policy cannot ignore the enormous amount of
evidence of animus in the legislative history of "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell."
284. Id. at 979.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 979-80.
287. See 139 CONG. REC. H7065-03 (1993).
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Despite the revisionist recollection of some courts, 288
Congressional debates over the Clinton proposal were anything but
balanced. Discussion of Clinton's proposal took place amidst a
political firestorm, in which Clinton was aggressively demeaned as a
captive of a special interest group who did not have the credentials to
lead the military. 28 9 The political tension generated by opponents of
the President's proposal threatened to undermine the Clinton
administration's ability to govern, not just in military affairs, but in
other areas. Not only did President Clinton face a veto-proof majority
in Congress in support of the former ban, Clinton was essentially held
hostage to a potential public relations disaster in the form of a threat
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to resign en masse if he persisted in going
forward with his proposal to eliminate the gay ban.290 Not
surprisingly, the "compromise" to which Clinton eventually agreed
essentially left the status quo unchanged.
Clinton's proposal to focus on conduct and not identity received
an overwhelmingly negative response in the Senate. Not surprisingly,
anti-gay animus that focused almost exclusively on the threat to
military masculinity posed by homosexual men stoked the political
storm in both houses. 29' Among other things, gay military members
288. See, e.g., Richenberg v. Perry, 73 F.3d 172, 173 (8th Cir. 1996). The court
cited the "lengthy public debate" that took place involving Congress and the
President during the passage of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" to reject a motion for an
injunction to bar the Air Force from discharging Richenberg. Id. See also
Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 923 (4th Cir. 1996) (describing the policy as a
"statute that embodies the exhaustive efforts of the democratically accountable
branches of American government and an enactment that reflects month upon month
of political negotiation and deliberation"). However, careful analysis of the
legislative history of the act reveals a one-sided game of careful retrenchment by
congressional opponents of an open policy and by military leaders that leads to little
if any change.
289. "The President, in a tough campaign, made commitments to special
interest groups that, if elected, he would lift the ban on gay service in the military.
The President then took office, set up a commission, looked at the hard facts, and
came out with a policy that did not make sense to anybody." 139 CONG. REC.
S 11157-04, S 11193 (1993) (statement of Sen. Gramm).
290. HALLEY, supra note 41, at 20.
291. See, e.g., Kenneth Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation
of the Armed Forces, 38 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 499, 501, 545-47 (1991) (identifying "the
pursuit of manhood" or masculinity as one of the principal forces driving the former
gay ban in the U.S. military).
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were reduced to the role of promiscuous threats to public health.292
According to Senator Murkowski (R. Alaska), opening the door to
gays would endanger the health of military veterans by redirecting
precious resources designated for their care to carriers of AIDS.293
Moreover, the proposal to lift the ban took place amidst the realities of
the end of the Cold War, which had resulted in a sharp reduction of
the numbers of military personnel, 294 enabling political opponents to
characterize the debate as one involving a new openness to gays while
simultaneously closing the door to patriotic heterosexual military
veterans.
On September 28, 1993, the House of Representatives met to
consider three versions of the new policy on gays in the military. One
version, presented by Representative Mehan, proposed to leave all
decisions regarding gays in the military in the hands of the
President.295 A second proposal, presented by Representative Hunter,
advocated for a continuation of the complete ban and a codification of
questions regarding sexual orientation prior to induction into the
military.296 The third version contained most of the components of
today's policy and was proposed by Representative Skelton.297
292. See 139 CONG. REC. S1262-02 (1993) (statement of Sen. Smith) ("One
thing is for certain, by legitimizing homosexuality in the Armed Forces, the
President is ensuring that homosexual behavior will, inevitably, become more
brazen and prevalent. Promiscuity, already a major health problem in the
homosexual community, will likely increase in on-base clubs, local nightclubs, and
throughout forces deployed worldwide. While some may dismiss this threat as
exaggerated, the reality is that such promiscuity could have a very direct impact on
the incidence of sexually transmitted diseases within the Armed Forces.").
293. Id. (statement of Sen. Murkowski) ("A decision to admit gays to the
military will not be a free one. That decision will be paid for in increased funding
for VA, or by the veterans [that the] VA must turn away in order to care for the new
AIDS cases the decision will bring.").
294. Discussions of Clinton's proposal in the Senate coincided with the
President's plans to eliminate 200,000 military personnel because of the end of the
Cold War. Id. (statement of Sen. Smith). The proposal to lift the ban, while
eliminating large numbers of personnel, was depicted as the reckless work of a
traditional anti-military liberal whose anti-war activities and lack of military service
rendered him incapable of serving as Commander-in-Chief. Id.
295. 139 CONG. REC. H7065-03 (1993).
296. Id.
297. Id.
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Hunter's amendment received the most vocal support from
proponents of an absolute ban. Framing their objections to integration
of gays and lesbians in religious and moral terms, defenders of the ban
had no difficulty stressing that a person's homosexual orientation was
the equivalent of immoral, reprehensible, or even criminal conduct.298
Hunter depicted gays and lesbians as uncontrollable sexual predators
who must be barred from service. To rally support for the codification
of the military's practice of inquiring about the sexual orientation of
new service members, Hunter warned that "in 1981 homosexual
activities ... were bad for the young men and women serving in the
military, 84 percent of whom were unconsenting victims."2 99 Thus,
according to Hunter, the real reason for his amendment was not
"moral concern, unit cohesion, and all the other things that [came out
during the hearing], but it [was] because of the duty of trust we owe to
our constituents to protect their children in uniform." 300
The vilification of gays and lesbians in the House was not
confined to people in uniform. Speaking after Congressman Frank, an
openly gay member of Congress voiced strong support of a policy
based on conduct and not identity. Congressman Dornan refused to
allow the House to be "lectured about well-behaved homosexuals by
some Members with, shall we say, behavioral problems of their
own. ,,301 Though he was chastised by the Chairman for
inappropriate remarks concerning a sitting Member, Dornan continued
his assault by denying President Clinton's assertion that Clinton "was
deeply impressed by the devotion to duty and country exhibited by
homosexuals who have served with distinction. '" 30 2 Dornan completed
298. Id. (statement of RPp. Spence) ("My own personal, moral and religious
belief[] [is] that the homosexual lifestyle is unnatural and immoral, as well as being
illegal in some States, and should not be legitimized by a cloak of acceptability in
our society.").
299. Id. (statement of Rep. Hunter).
300. Id. This sentiment was shared by Representative Sam Johnson of Texas,
who stated, "[W]e have got a lot of innocent kids in the service nowadays, guys that
do not understand the world .... I think that it is important that we protect those kids
in our service. I think it is something that we owe the parents of this Nation." Id.
(statement of Rep. Johnson).
301. Id. (statement of Rep. Dornan).
302. Id. (referring to Clinton's remarks). Doman stated that "[w]e keep hearing
that, but there [sic] is the evidence of all this distinction?" Id.
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his attack by denying the existence of "witch hunts" against gays and
lesbians, maintaining that in his military experience, having served on
active duty at ten bases around the country, there had been instances
of homosexual conduct on eight of those bases, each involving
dishonorable conduct and dishonorable discharges.30 3 Thus, without
more than his word to support his claim, Doman asserted that every
discharge of a gay or lesbian soldier he had ever known about had
involved dishonorable conduct. Skelton's amendment was ultimately
passed after members of the House were assured that little or nothing
would change under this new version.
Congressional debates over the new policy were surprisingly
candid. Perhaps sensing their advantage, opponents of the policy
showed little to no restraint in their condemnation of gays and their
Congressional supporters. Military and Congressional leaders
portrayed gay men and women in the military as promiscuous
predators that had no control over their sexual desires 304 a s sexual
deviants who could not be trusted with young lives.30 5 Despite
President Clinton's assurance that his proposal focused on conduct,
those who opposed the new policy saw no need to distinguish between
identity and conduct. 0 6 Gay identity continued to be a proxy for
criminal predatory sexual conduct, notwithstanding the fact that gays
were no more likely than heterosexuals to engage in such conduct.
Congressional animosity toward gays in the military was
exceeded by military leaders, who came out in full force to oppose to
President Clinton's initiative. 30 7 To military leaders, the presence of
known gays and lesbians represented an affront to the middle-
American values that drove the military to success.30 8 Openly gay
303. Id.
304. See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
305. See 139 CONG. REC. S1262-02 (statement of Sen. Smith).
306. See 139 CONG. REc. S1262-02 (statement of Sen. Wallop) ("It is not the
individual qualities of the homosexual, but rather homosexuality itself, which is
incompatible with military service.").
307. Lifting the ban would "'destroy the military."' Id. (statement of Sen.
Smith (quoting General Norman Schwartzkopf)).
308. See TASK FORCE ON MILITARY PERS., supra note 46, at 3 ("[T]hese
hearings, I think, are of great importance to the American people because there are
literally thousands of families sitting at their kitchen tables and in their front rooms
watching television, having heard the President's pronouncements, waiting to see
[Vol. 44
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military personnel were thus criticized as a threat to national
security.3" 9 Admiral Moorer, an aggressive critic of the Clinton
initiative, argued that openly gay military personnel represented a
moral downgrade of the military3 10 because their uncontrollable sexual
urges3 11 and their unmistakable effeminate characteristics would
render them ineffective as soldiers or military leaders. 312 To Admiral
Moorer, keeping gays out of the military was necessary not only to
protect the military from moral corruption, but to protect the
sensibilities and morale of military wives.313 Moorer essentially
echoed Bowers when he condemned gays as carriers of the most
how Capitol Hill deals with this issue. And sitting with those families are their 17-,
18- and 19-year-old children who are encouraged and have been encouraged to join
the American military. And I think that it could be accurately stated that middle
America is a wellspring for this great voluntary military force .... And the question
is going to be are we going to lose this perception by middle America of the military
as a wholesome environment for their young people; and, should we lose that, what
effect will it have on our ability to accomplish that mission?") (statement of Rep.
Duncan Hunter).
309. Statement of Rep. John T. Doolittle (R-CA): "I think homosexuality is a
severe problem in this society .... I think we're playing with very, very serious
matters in this country that go right to the heart of our preparedness and right to the
issues of national security." Id. at 6. Statement by Rep. Bentley: "This issue is so
very, very vital, I think, and can make such a difference to the future of national
security." Id.
310. "I must say that this issue, to me, is the most important, the most
disturbing, that I've ever encountered in war or peace because what is going on here
is an effort in effect to downgrade and demean and break down the whole structure
of our military forces .... Id. at 7-8.
311. "So those that come into the armed services must be qualified, and the
homosexuals, as I will go into later, are not qualified for that kind of duty because of
the impact they have on the organization overall-because they do not practice
discipline and self-control .... Id. at 8.
312. "You might ask the question will the troops respect a platoon if it's well-
known in their unit that he's a homosexual? And I can guarantee you that these
young people who are young.., will spot a homosexual a mile away .... "Id.
313.
What will the ladies living on the base think about these people that are
exposed to their children? They're not going to like it at all. And the
morale of the ladies, the wives on the base, are dictated in effect by the
morale of the fighting men that are present.
Id. at 9.
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reprehensible kind of natural punishment for an immoral lifestyle.3 14
The intimidating one-sided nature and the lack of objectivity of
the legislative discussion over "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" did not escape
Senator Edward Kennedy. Kennedy challenged the validity of the
legislative "findings" intended to provide justification for the policy,
and submitted a statement for the legislative record to expose the
controversial hearings that had been conducted by the Senate Armed
Services Committee.315 Kennedy wrote separately to preserve the
hearings in some detail.316 Noting that the first hearing had been
described as "an objective presentation of the history of the ban and
the legal issues surrounding a potential lifting of the ban,"317 Kennedy
pointed out that the committee had called on a non-expert who relied
on secondary sources while ignoring experts who had done primary
research in the area.31 8 With respect to constitutional issues that would
arise after the lifting of the ban, Kennedy also pointed out that the
committee had relied on two witnesses, who, although experts on
military law, were not experts on constitutional law.3 19 In fact,
Kennedy noted, [a]lthough [the committee's expert] discussed
constitutional issues at length, he never mentioned the key Supreme
Court cases of Palmore v. Sidotti or Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center,"320 perhaps the two most important cases in this area. In light
of the extensive testimony presented by those witnesses, Kennedy
found it "unfortunate that the Committee did not hear from preeminent
constitutional scholars-such as Guido Calabresi" of whom the
314.
Everyone knows-no one can dispute that the homosexuals as a group are
responsible for introducing into this country and spreading-because of
their very filthy and immoral practice, we have a disease spread all over
this country now ... And when the homosexuals in the military catch
AIDS, don't forget when you get enlisted or appointed or commissioned,
you are, in effect, given a lifetime medical insurance. And so there's
Uncle Sam, the taxpayer, paying for this for I don't know how long, just at
a time when the military budgets are really strapped.
Id.
315. 139 CONG. REC. S11157-04 (1993) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id. (citations omitted).
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committee could have asked questions.321 Nonetheless, Kennedy
stated, many "legal scholars (including Dean Calabresi) prepared
written testimony discussing the unconstitutionality of the ban." 322
Regarding unit cohesion, Kennedy noted that the committee had
called three witnesses whose testimony had been crucial to Findings
13 and 15 of the amendment.323 Those witnesses, whose testimony
was anything but unanimous on whether gay people could serve
openly, provided the main source of expert testimony for the
committee.324 However, as Kennedy pointed out, just as significant to
the committee's ability to issue findings were the witnesses who were
never called. Kennedy cited two studies that had been conducted by
the DOD itself,325 and two other studies performed by the GAO.
According to Kennedy, the first GAO study was a comprehensive
look at the cost of the policy, other nations' military policies on
homosexual service, and non-discrimination policies in other U.S.
paramilitary organizations; the second dealt with policies regarding
homosexual service in twenty-five foreign countries. 326 Despite the
fact that all of these studies supported service by openly gay people,
Kennedy noted with some dismay that "the authors of these studies
never testified before the Committee." 327
According to Kennedy, "the most striking gap in the information
provided to the Committee was the absence of the study conducted by
the Rand Corporation," which the DOD had commissioned to inform
the debate.32 8 Other than an assurance by the Secretary of Defense that
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Kennedy noted that "Dr. Henderson was adamant that allowing openly
gay people to serve in the military would have a severe and disastrous effect on unit
cohesion," while not being able to cite any studies on the subject. Id. Kennedy also
noted that a second witness, Dr. Marlowe, was of the opinion that "simply stating
one is gay could be considered injecting one's homosexuality into the group." Id. In
addition, Kennedy pointed out that "Dr. Korb testified that his personal experience
led him to believe that gay people could serve openly and effectively in the military
and that any cohesion problems could be addressed through good leadership." Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
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he had been briefed on the RAND report and had considered the data
in making his determination, the committee was never briefed on that
report. Therefore, the committee made its findings on unit cohesion
devoid of data and witnesses which "would have been essential for a
fair-minded and objective assessment of the issue."32 9
Kennedy was also disturbed by other gaps in the testimony before
the committee. Regarding gay service in foreign countries, Kennedy
lamented that no witness was produced that had detailed knowledge of
the situation in Canada and Australia. 330 Both Canada and Australia,
two countries with similar cultures to the U.S., recently lifted their
bans and had previously expressed concerns over unit cohesion. 3
Kennedy also revealed that he had received over 100 testimonials
from heterosexual and homosexual individuals who were in some way
connected with Norfolk Naval Base.332 All 100 opposed the ban.333
However, homosexual servicemembers feared that public testimony
would reveal their sexual identity, either through the actual testimony
or through a post-testimony investigation.334  Heterosexual
servicemembers also did not want to testify against the ban because
they feared that their own sexual identity would be called into
question. 335 "Many of [those] individuals recounted in detail the
atmosphere of fear and coercion that existed in military bases during
the time when lifting of the ban was under consideration which
precluded these individuals from feeling safe in speaking up against
the ban., 336
In conclusion, Kennedy stated that if the debate on the policy
showed anything, it showed that exclusion of gays from the military
has nothing to do with conduct; rather, it has to do with the fears and
concerns of heterosexual service members who believe that they do
not know any homosexual service members and who cannot bear to
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
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serve with homosexuals.337 Indeed, as this article has demonstrated,
the most powerful driving force of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" continues
to be a concession to the unfounded fears of a minority of
heterosexual service members. Accommodating such prejudices is not
a legitimate governmental interest.
VI. WHAT WILL HAPPEN IF "DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL"
Is OVERTURNED
The experiences of other countries will prove instructive
regarding the likely consequences of overturning the gay ban. Those
experiences reveal that little will change if the policy is overturned.
Comparisons with other countries were prominent during the debates
on "Don't Ask, Don't Tell." '338 Though other countries, most notably
NATO countries, were more open to gays and lesbians,3 39
Congressional critics went to great lengths to demonstrate that, even
in those countries, concerns over the integration of gays and lesbians
into military service were still severe. 340
Although Congress had commissioned a multi-million dollar
study of the issue by the RAND Corporation, Senator Warner
introduced an article from the Army Times entitled, "NATO
Acceptance of Gays Runs Full Spectrum" as empirical evidence. 341
The article stated that despite more liberal policies than the current
U.S. ban, "nations that allow homosexuals to serve openly had not
resolved the problem of fully integrating them into their armies."342
For example, the article noted that "[g]ay German officers [found]
paths to promotion blocked, and in some cases [had] been blocked
from access to classified material . . . . The article also stressed
that gay life in the German military could be unpleasant.34 Though
problems feared by U.S. commanders had yet to materialize in the
337. See id.
338. 139 CONG. REc. S1262-02 (1993) (statement of Sen. Warner).
339. See id.
340. See id.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id.
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German military, Germany neverthetheless withheld promotions from
gay officers under the belief that they could not command adequate
respect from fellow soldiers. 345 Even so, German officials reported
that anti-gay violence, lowered readiness, and discipline problems had
not materialized.346
On the other hand, the article stated that "Britain's policy on gays
in the military [was] quite simple." According to Chris Pengelly, a
spokesman at the British Embassy, "[w]hen you come out of the
closet, you also come out of the army." 347 "And although policies on
homosexuals in the military [were] being challenged and changed in
other countries, Britons interviewed in Washington and London said
there [was] little if any sentiment for change in Great Britain." 348 The
fact that countries such as Canada and Australia had recently lifted
their gay bans made no difference in Britain.349 "Britain's military
leadership contend[ed], much like its U.S. counterpart, that allowing
homosexuals to serve would hurt the military., 350 "John Keegan,
military editor of The Daily Telegraph in London, recently wrote that
in the wake of Australia's decision to lift its gay ban, 'The moment for
experimentation with homosexual military rights is not yet with us,
and probably never will be."' 351
The article also included information on Norway, where gays and
lesbians have been allowed to serve openly in the armed forces for the
past 14 years: 352
"Basically, the difference between the United States and Norway is
that in Norway, it's not an issue," said Air Force Lt. Col. Ragnar
Haugholt, the assistant Army, Navy and Air Force attach6 for the
Norwegian Embassy here. "A lot of what is going on in the United
States is based on believing not knowing." 353
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id.
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Norway ended its gay ban in 1979 with very few consequences.
354
Similarly, according to the article, France did not discriminate
against gays and lesbians as long as they obeyed the rules of the
French armed forces.355 Capt. Phillipe Hunter, a spokesperson for the
minister of defense said, "For example, it is not possible to punish
somebody because of his sexual life. But if this person makes some
sexual harassment upon other members of his unit, he will be in
trouble." 3
56
Senator Warner introduced another Army Times article, "In Israel:
The Hard Reality," to dramatize the harsh reality of gay life in the
Israeli Military. 357 The article told the story of Yaron, a 30-year-old
reserve lieutenant in the Israeli navy.35 8 The article questioned how a
homosexual like Yaron handled his duties aboard an attack boat
surrounded by other men. 359 The author found that question especially
relevant given the fact that critics of the U.S. ban had pointed to Israel,
France and Germany as models of integration. 360 In contrast to a story
in the New York Times that had lauded the Israeli military for
successful integration, the Army Times noted that known gays in the
Israeli military are forced to "undergo psychological testing to remain
in the service. . . . [B]arred from positions requiring top security
clearances.... [And] rarely are assigned to combat units do not serve
without stigma" 36 because they are considered "abnormal both in the
military and Israeli society. 362
In the Army Times story Yaron revealed that, though his
performance reviews were excellent, he was concerned about sexual
tension.363 Consequently, Yaron felt compelled to hide his sexual
orientation.364 Fearing that his subordinates would not take orders
354. See id.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id.
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from him if they knew that he was gay, Yaron chose to keep his
sexual orientation private. 365 Still, Yaron said emphatically that he
would never have sexual relations with a subordinate.3
66
According to the article, the success of the Israeli military with
gays and lesbians is attributed to the Israeli concept of universal
military service, which is a "springboard to successful civilian career;"
to the military's ability to determine assignments and promotions
based on quality; and to psychological testing administered to every
individual. who claims to be a homosexual.367 Though most
homosexuals were permitted to remain in the service after
psychological testing, they could be restricted from serving on
particular units. 368 Nonetheless, Israel reported that there is "no
evidence that homosexuals are less effective in combat than
heterosexuals., 369 The vision of the harsh reality of life in the military
for gays in Israel was also advanced by Senator Gramm: "I would just
like for the record to show that the Israeli military is one of the most
restrictive militaries on the planet in terms of the promotion and
participation of avowed homosexuals. 3
70
Gramm's opinion of the harsh reality of ife for gay s and lesbians
in the Israeli military did not comport with a study done by the RAND
Corporation, which was available to Congress in 1993, but was
conveniently ignored by opponents of the new policy.37' The RAND
study found that gays and lesbians have been allowed to serve in the
Israeli military since Israel was founded in 1948.372 It also found that
Israel poses no restriction on the promotion of gays and lesbians.373
Importantly, RAND also found that Israeli law was more supportive
of homosexual rights than U.S. law.374 Noting that the former official
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id. (statement of Sen. Gramm).
371. RAND STUDY, supra note 27, at xvii.
372. See id. at 85-87 (stating that military service is compelled for everyone in
Israel and that all restrictions, specifically those prohibiting homosexuals from top
security intelligence positions, have been lifted).
373. See id. at 87.
374. Id. at 86-87 (noting that homosexual acts between consenting partners
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military policy potentially restricted homosexuals from serving in
intelligence positions, the RAND Corporation observed that the policy
was abandoned in 1993.375
The Israeli military is an important comparator to the United
States armed forces, because both countries have experienced constant
military activity in the last half of the twentieth century. As the Israeli
experience has shown, a history of effective military service has
helped legitimize the right of gays and lesbians to serve in uniform. In
the end, the Israeli experience has repeatedly shown that military
success depends heavily on preparation, strategy, logistics, and
resources, and much less on individual interpersonal relationships.
The most significant modem parallel to the experience of the
United States military can be found in England, where the government
terminated an absolute ban on gays and lesbians in January of 2000.376
As was the case in the U.S., British authorities advocated for a
complete ban on gays and lesbians to protect their youthful members
from the perceived danger of homosexual sexual predators and to
promote recruitment.377
After a serious challenge to the ban in the British High Court, the
British Ministry of Defense assembled the Homosexual Policy
Assessment Team to assess the situation and determine whether
changes were needed.378 The Team analyzed policies from the U.S.,
Australia, Canada, Israel and the Netherlands. 37 9 After a leak of a
possible compromise, the Team recommended the continuation of the
ban, which was justified along the same lines as the exclusionary
American policy.380 The ban was strongly supported by people in
uniform. Comments such as "[m]en don't like taking showers with
men who like taking showers with men," and "homosexuals will be
over the age of 17 was no longer a crime; and that since 1992, discrimination in
employment on the basis of sexual orientation has been illegal).
375. Id. at 87-88.
376. AARON BELKIN & R.L. EVANS, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF SEXUAL
MINORITIES IN THE MILITARY, THE EFFECTS OF INCLUDING GAY AND LESBIAN
SOLDIERS IN THE BRITISH ARMED FORCES: APPRAISING THE EVIDENCE 2 (2000),
available at http://www.palmcenter.org/files/active/0/Britain1.pdf.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 19.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 19-20.
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beaten up" were common. 38 1 As had been the case in the U.S. with the
MWG, the Team recommended continuation of the ban even though
committee members who had visited other countries had learned that
the integration of gays had made little difference. 382 That stance was
shared by the British armed forces minister and the three chiefs of
staff.38
3
On September 27, 1999, the European Court of Human Rights
ruled unanimously that the ban on homosexual military service
violated the privacy rights of the plaintiffs.384 In deciding which
regulations to adopt to implement the court's ruling, the British
military rejected the American "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" model as a
complete disaster.385 Instead, it opted for a set of regulations based on
conduct governing "sex not sexuality, '386 based on the Australian
model.
The British regulations implementing the new policy are based on
the fundamental principle that a person's sexual orientation is a
private matter.387 Not surprisingly, little happened after the lifting of
the ban. Except for a few resignations of proponents of the ban, there
was no mas exodus of disgrunleu service nembers ollowing the
lifting of the ban.388
Here, it is important to note that the passage of an anti-
discrimination law will not necessarily lead to rapid integration of the
military. Studies of militaries in countries without gay bans have
shown that the passage of anti-discrimination legislation will not
result in a massive wave of revelations of soldiers' sexual orientation
or "coming out.'389 Whether a person comes out as gay or lesbian
involves a profoundly personal and private decision, which is best
381. Id. at 21.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 22.
384. Id. at 23.
385. Id. at 24.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 27.
388. Id. at 45.
389. In fact, Congress was well aware of this during the debates about the
passage of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell." As early as 1993, the RAND Corporation had
found that a massive "coming out" of gay men and women had not occurred in any
country that had lifted its ban on gays. See RAND STUDY, supra note 27, at 14.
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made when the person feels safe and supported. Thus, many
individuals are likely to maintain their sexual identity secret until they
no longer feel threatened by the revelation.
While the military is different from police and fire departments,
the integration of homosexual police and firemen into those areas can
help inform the likely outcome of a non-discrimination policy in the
military.39 ° More helpful yet is an examination of the experiences of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and of the Central Intelligence
Agency, two agencies that run training programs that most resemble
the experience of military personnel. Both the FBI and the CIA have
training regiments much like the military.39 ' Just like in the military,
the organizations' training programs also require the relinquishment of
a certain amount of privacy. 392 In fact, for many FBI and CIA
operatives, the physical environment of their work is one and the same
as the physical environment where people in uniform perform their
responsibilities, as they work side-by-side with the military in times of
war. 393 Similar to the military experiences of other countries, a
massive "coming out" has not taken place because of the liberalization
of policies regarding who can participate. Indeed, little has changed in
those occupations or organizations since discriminatory policies have
been eliminated.
VII. CONCLUSION
Despite a mountain of evidence to the contrary, federal courts
have continued to defer to the irrational fears and prejudices of a
shrinking group of heterosexuals regarding the presence of openly gay
service members in the military. The courts' continued reluctance to
address the issue from a searching rational basis perspective is not
shared by military courts. Importantly, a growing number of military
leaders have come to recognize the unnecessary waste in human
390. See RAND STUDY, supra note 27, at 15-20.
391. Press Release, Michael D. Palm Ctr., As More Intelligence Agents Work
with Military Personnel, Scholars Question Rationale for Pentagon's Gay Ban (July
15, 2002), available at http://www.palmcenter.org/press/dadt/releases/asmore_
intelligence-agents_work-with -military-personnelscholars-question-rationale-for
_pentagon_s_gayban.
392. See id.
393. See id
63
Correales: Don't Ask, Don't Tell: A Dying Policy on the Precipice
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2007
476 CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44
resources represented by the policy and have called for its immediate
abolition. Many members of the military share this sentiment,
expressing no apprehension or fear of serving alongside gay people in
uniform. The time has come for Congress to revisit the policy.
However, this time, Congressional and military leaders must conduct
an informed discussion of the real consequences of discrimination.
Congress cannot once again be guided by uninformed preconceptions
and irrational fears as it decides whether to continue a discriminatory
practice that has been abandoned by the majority of civilized countries
world-wide.
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